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In what follows, I look, in a very general way, at a particularly interesting half century,  in the 
history of computation.  The central purpose will be to throw light on how computing activity at 
the University of Manchester developed in the immediate post-war years and, in the context of 
this conference, to situate Alan Turing in the Manchester landscape.  One of the main 
methodological premises on which I will depend is that the history of technology is, at heart, the 
history of people.  No historically-sophisticated understanding of the development of the 
computer is possible in the absence of an appreciation of the background, motivation and 
aspirations of the principal actors.   The life and work of Alan Turing is the central focus of this 
conference but, in the Manchester context, it is also important that attention be paid to F.C. 
Williams, T. Kilburn and M.H.A. Newman.  
 
The Origins of Computing in Pre-war Cambridge 
David Hilbert's talk at the Sorbonne on the morning of the 8th August 1900 in which he 
proposed twenty-three "future problems", effectively set the agenda for mathematics research in 
the 20th century.  The tenth of Hilbert’s questions2 led directly to Hilbert and Ackerman’s 1928 
formulation of the Entscheidungsproblem (Hilbert & Ackerman, 1928 p.134), which Hilbert 
considered to be "the central problem of mathematical logic" (Davis, 1982 p.134).  The essence 
of the question was: could there exist, at least in principle, a definite method or process involving 
a finite number of steps, by which the validity of any given first-order logic statement might be 
decided?   
The original 1900 formulation of the problem was not finally answered until 1970 
(Matiyasevich, 1970) but the 1928 version proved more immediately tractable.  Turing seems 
first to have encountered the Entscheidungsproblem around the Spring of 1935 when he was a 
student on Max Newman’s Part III course on the foundations of mathematics.  Solving the 
Entscheidungsproblem rigorously was entirely dependent on the extent to which a formalisation 
of the notion of "process" could be devised and it was this task which Turing accomplished so 
dramatically.  As Max Newman recalled in 1975: 
“Oh I knew [Turing]  very well.  …I believe it all started because he 
attended a lecture of mine on foundations of mathematics and logic in 
which I had mentioned in the lecture the importance of having such a 
definition and I think I said, in the course of this lecture, that what is meant 
by saying that the process is constructive is that it’s purely a mechanical... 
                                                 
1 Email david.anderson@port.ac.uk.  http://www.cdpa.co.uk/UoP/ 
2 The determination of the solvability of a diophantine equation. 
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machine and I may even have said a machine can do it. But he took the 
notion and really tried to follow it right up and did produce this 
extraordinary definition of a perfectly general, what he called, computable 
function. Thus, giving the first idea really of a perfectly general computing 
machine.”(Evans, 1975)3 
 
In the middle of April 1936, Turing gave Newman the draft4 of his answer in the negative to 
Hilbert’s question. (Hodges, 1992 p.109) Turing’s solution was an extraordinary combination of 
the physical and the abstract at the heart of which was an idealised description of a person 
carrying out numerical computation.   
 
“We may compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a 
machine which is only capable of a finite number of conditions q1, q2, ..., 
qR which will be called “m-configurations”. The machine is supplied with a 
“tape”, (the analogue of paper) running through it, and divided into 
sections (called “squares”) each capable of bearing a “symbol”. At any 
moment there is just one square, say the r-th, bearing the symbol S(r) which 
is “in the machine”. We may call this square the “scanned square”. The 
symbol on the scanned square may be called the “scanned symbol”. The 
“scanned symbol” is the only one of which the machine is, so to speak, 
“directly aware”. However, by altering its m-configuration the machine can 
effectively remember some of the symbols which it has “seen” (scanned) 
previously. The possible behaviour of the machine at any moment is 
determined by the m-configuration qn and the scanned symbol S(r). This 
pair qn, S(r) will be called the “configuration”: thus the configuration 
determines the possible behaviour of the machine. In some of the 
configurations in which the scanned square is blank (i.e. bears no symbol) 
the machine writes down a new symbol on the scanned square: in other 
configurations it erases the scanned symbol. The machine may also change 
the square which is being scanned, but only by shifting it one place to right 
or 1eft. In addition to any of these operations the m-configuration may be 
changed. Some of the symbols written down will form the sequence of 
figures which is the decimal of the real number which is being computed. 
The others are just rough notes to “assist the memory”. It will only be these 
rough notes which will be liable to erasure” (A. M. Turing, 1936 pp.231-2) 
 
Following Church (Church, 1937) we have come to call this characterisation a 
“Turing machine” and it is today so familiar a notion that it is easy to overlook the 
extent to which it must have seemed at the time  “shockingly industrial” (Hodges, 
1992 p.107). 
 
Newman read the paper in mid May and was sceptical in the first instance, believing 
it must be possible to construct a machine capable of doing more than Turing’s 
machine could do.  Soon after Newman had convinced himself of the correctness of 
Turing’s reasoning, he received a copy of Alonzo Church’s “An Unsolvable Problem 
of Elementary Number Theory” (Church, 1936), which while anticipating Turing’s 
                                                 
3 I am indebted to JAN Lee for first directing my attention to the Evans’ “Pioneers of Computing” interviews.  I first 
actually heard the M.H.A. Newman interview in 1998 courtesy of B.J. Copeland who was kind enough to let me 
hear his copy when I was acting as a visiting researcher at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. 
4 This was finally published as A.M. Turing (1936) 
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result did so by a very different, more circuitous  and, in some ways weaker, method.  
Turing’s paper was submitted to the Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 
on 28th May 1936 and was refereed by Church.  It is widely considered as perhaps the 
most important “computing” paper ever published. 
 
Turing’s election, fifteen years later, as a Fellow of the Royal Society was on the basis of his 
work on the Entscheidungsproblem.  However, he did enjoy some more immediate success.  In 
1935,  aged just 22, Turing secured a King’s College Fellowship having submitted a dissertation 
entitled ‘On the Gaussian Error Function’ in which he proved or, more accurately, re-proved,  the 
Central Limit Theorem5.  In 1936,  the same work earned Turing the prestigious Smith’s Prize 
for Mathematics6.  
 
Typically, Turing’s work on the Entscheidungsproblem was a solo effort, par excellence, as 
Newman wrote to Church on the 31st May 1936: 
 
“I should mention that Turing's work is entirely independent: he has been 
working without any supervision or criticism from anyone.  This makes it all 
the more important that he should come into  contact as soon as possible 
with the leading workers in this line, so that he should not develop into a 
confirmed solitary.” (Hodges, 1992 pp.112-3) 
 
Unfortunately, Newman’s hopes for Turing, in this respect at least, were dashed.  With the 
departure from Princeton the year before of Gödel, Kleene, Rosser and Bernays, logicians were 




The Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton, USA 
 
Newman made arrangements for Turing to attend Princeton with the purpose of working towards 
a doctoral degree under Church’s supervision.  This, Turing’s “deepest and most difficult work” 
(Hodges, 2004), was completed in 1938.  It “investigated the structure of uncomputable 
functions, with a suggestion that these were related to human intuition.” (Hodges, 2004).   
 
According to Copeland and Proudfoot (Copeland, 1998) (Copeland & Proudfoot, 1999), Turing’s 
1938 Ph.D. thesis was also noteworthy for having anticipated in detail the idea of 
“hypercomputation”7.   However, Hodges (1999) (2007) and Davis (2004) (2006) have between 
them raised a number of serious and so-far unsatisfactorily-answered questions concerning the 
                                                 
5 Turing’s work was carried out in 1934. Characteristically, he had not troubled to find out if the result he was after 
had already been achieved.  Unfortunately it had:  (See Lindeberg, 1922).  (Hodges, 1992 p.88) reports that Turing 
was advised, “provided that due explanation was given, it might still be acceptable as original work for a King’s 
fellowship dissertation”.    
6 Two annual prizes for awarded for proficiency in mathematics and natural philosophy.  The Smith’s Prize was 
established in 1768 by a bequest from the Master of Trinity College, Robert Smith. The prizes have been awarded 
every year since, except for 1917 when there were no candidate.  Other winners include: G. B. Airy 1823,  G. G. 
Stokes 1841, Arthur Cayley 1842, William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) 1845, J. Clerk Maxwell 1854 , J. W. L. Strutt 
(Lord Rayleigh) 1865, J. J. Thomson 1880, E. T. Whittaker 1896, G. H. Hardy 1901, 
Arthur Eddington 1907, J. E. Littlewood 1908 and Fred Hoyle 1938.  For a good account of the history of the prize 
(See Barrow-Green, 1999). 
7 This term is not Turing’s but was introduced by Copeland to describe various speculative methods for computing 
non-Turing-computable functions. 
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singular interpretation of Turing’s views promoted by Copeland and Proudfoot as well as 
providing strong grounds for doubting  the prospects for “hypercomputation”.  
 
Randell (1972) has suggested that von Neumann’s thinking was influenced by Turing’s pre-war 
work on the Entscheidungsproblem and cites the recollections of Stanley Frankel as evidence 
that von Neumann was quite open in acknowledging his debt to, and the central importance of, 
Turing’s work:  
 
“I know that in or about 1943 or ‘44 von Neumann was well aware of the 
fundamental importance of Turing’s paper of 1936 ‘On computable 
numbers . . .’ which describes in principle the ‘Universal Computer’ of 
which every modern computer (perhaps not ENIAC as first completed but 
certainly all later ones) is a realization. Von Neumann introduced me to that 
paper and at his urging I studied it with care. Many people have acclaimed 
von Neumann as the ‘father of the computer’ (in a modern sense of the term) 
but I am sure that he would never have made that mistake himself. He might 
well be called the midwife, perhaps, but he firmly emphasized to me, and to 
others I am sure, that the fundamental conception is owing to Turing - 
insofar as not anticipated by Babbage, Lovelace, and others. In my view von 
Neumann’s essential role was in making the world aware of these 
fundamental concepts introduced by Turing and of the development work 
carried out in the Moore school and elsewhere. Certainly I am indebted to 
him for my introduction to these ideas and actions. Both Turing and von 
Neumann, of course, also made substantial contributions to the ‘reduction 
to practice’ of these concepts but I would not regard these as comparable in 
importance with the introduction and explication of the concept of a 
computer able to store in its memory its program of activities and of 
modifying that program in the course of these activities.” (Frankel, 1972) 
 
While it does appear that Turing’s work was, by 1943-44, influential on von Neumann, the 
precise extent of the influence and the exact date when and the means by which it was first 
exercised is rather less clear.  Writing on June 1st 1937 von Neumann remarks: 
 
“Mr. A.M. Turing has informed me that he is applying for a Proctor Visiting 
Fellowship to Princeton University for the academic year 1937-1938.  I 
should like to support his application and to inform you that I know Mr. 
Turing very well from previous years:  during the last term of 1935, when I 
was a visiting professor in Cambridge, and during 1936-1937, which year 
Mr. Turing has spent in Princeton, I had opportunity to observe his 
scientific work.  He has done good work in branches of mathematics in 
which I am interested, namely: theory of almost periodic functions, and 
theory of continuous groups” (Hodges, 1992 p.131)8 
 
Von Neumann makes no reference here to Turing’s most substantial and mathematically 
significant work, “On Computable Numbers”.  This would be perfectly understandable if von 
Neumann was unaware of the paper until some time after the middle of 1937. Consequently, it 
seems unlikely he would have, before that time, been discussing with Turing the latter’s assault 
                                                 
8 A copy of the original Von Neumann letter is held in Turing’s file at the Department of Mathematics, Princeton 
University. 
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on the Entscheidungsproblem (or how, by extension, it might be possible to actually build a 
universal Turing machine).  Hodges suggests that Turing may have been “too shy to press his 
work upon the ‘mathematical bigwig’(Hodges, 1992 p.132). Such reticence is entirely consistent 
with what we know of Turing’s character.  A year later, in the Summer of 1938, von Neumann 
does appear to have encountered “On Computable Numbers” and was proposing to Stanislaw 
Ulam, a game of “writing down on a piece of paper as big a number as we could, defining it by a 
method which indeed has something to do with some schemata of Turing’s” (Hodges, 1992 
p.145)9.   
 
It may reasonably be concluded that any relevant personal communication which took place 
between Turing and von Neumann during 1936-38 was fairly limited in character.  This view is 
supported by comments made by von Neumann’s long-term associate Herman Goldstine, in 
conversation with Chris Evans in 1975:    
 
“EVANS -  Could you say whatever you can about what you know about 
von Neumann’s early interest and the way in which he directed the… the 
thinking so that the projects were sort of inevitably drawn towards the 
idea of an electronic computer?   
 
GOLDSTINE -  Von Neumann was very well acquainted with Turing and 
Turing’s work. I know he had very substantial admiration for… for 
Turing and I think that acquaintance had a lot to do with the ultimate 
direction in which the computer went. 
 
EVANS -  I wonder how much cross fertilisation there was.  Sometimes 
some people will say not that they barely met but that the exchange of 
information between them was slight and other people, if I take the line 
that you are advancing, suggest that there was a fair bit of 
communication between them. 
 
GOLDSTINE -  No, I don’t know that there was communication, I don’t 
think that’s true.  I think the fact is that von Neumann understood all 
about Turing’s thesis and when the time came he brought that out of the 
recesses of his memory and utilised them, those ideas, for his own 
purposes.” (Evans, 1976g) 
 
The contemporary record equally gives no reason to believe that von Neumann was in any way 
instrumental in shaping Turing’s thinking during this period.  Indeed, ever the confirmed 
solitary,  being influenced by others was somewhat alien to Turing’s character.  As  Mike 
Woodger10 put it: 
 
“Well you have to understand that Turing was an utter individualist, 
that not a single thought would he allow in his head that wasn’t self-
generated.  This is rather an exaggeration but it did seem that way.  He 
worked at the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton USA before the 
war and knew von Neumann at that time.  I’m sure he had a healthy 
                                                 
9 Hodges is quoting from (Ulam, 1999). 
10 Woodger worked with Turing at the National Physical Laboratory from 1946 and made a contribution to the 
design of the ACE (Automatic Computing Engine) test assembly. 
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respect for these people but he would always do things for himself both 
theoretically and practically if at all possible.” (Lavington, 1976) 
 
In the Spring of 1938, von Neumann made Turing the offer of a research assistantship at the 
Institute of Advanced Study.  Turing turned down the opportunity and, in mid-July of the same 
year, returned to England where, almost immediately, he attended a course held in the 
headquarters of the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) (Hodges, 1992 p.148).  By 
the start of 1939, Turing was attending similar training sessions every two or three weeks and 
was attached to Dilly Knox11 and Peter Twinn. 12 Turing continued his relationship with the 
University, he still held a Fellowship at King’s College, and for a short period, beginning in the 
Spring of 1939, Turing delivered a course in the foundations of mathematics in the Faculty of 
Mathematics ("Cambridge University Reporter," 1939 p.100) .  On the 4th September 1939, 
immediately following the British declaration of war on Germany, Turing reported to Bletchley 
Park which, since August of the same year, had been the new home of the GC&CS13. 
 
Bletchley Park and the Birth of the Digital Computer 
 
No effort will be made here to describe in detail Turing’s cryptanalytic work.  Suffice it to say 
that his contributions were centrally important to the overall effort.   
The first notable inroads against Enigma were made far from Bletchley Park by the Polish Army 
"Cipher Bureau" (Biuro Szyfrów) headed by Captain Maksymilian Ciezki.  A small team of 
cryptanalysts, Marian Rejewski, Jerzy Rózycki and Henryk Zygalski enjoyed considerable 
success in deducing the rotor wiring of the Enigma cipher machines, using a combination of 
acute observation, mathematical inspiration and the application of elementary group theory.  In 
the Autumn of 1938, Rejewski developed an electro-mechanical device called the “Bomba” to 
automate and accelerate the process of searching for “keys” in the cipher text of intercepted 
messages.  In December of the same year, the Germans produced an improvement in the 
Enigma14 with the consequence that the Biuro Szyfrów did not any longer have the resources to 
prosecute successfully their cryptanalytic effort.  A meeting was arranged between the Biuro 
Szyfrów and their French and British counterparts at which the Poles brought their opposite 
numbers up to speed. 
Interestingly, the idea of  deploying a mechanised  attack on the mechanically generated Enigma 
cipher never seems to have occurred to anyone at the GC&CS prior to their meeting with the 
                                                 
11 Alfred Dillwyn 'Dilly' Knox was a Greek scholar from King’s College Cambridge.  He is credited as being the 
first person at the GC&CS to achieve success against Enigma. 
12  Peter Frank George Twinn was a mathematician from Brasenose College, Oxford. He was recruited to GC &CS 
early in 1939 after answering an advertis ement.  Twinn became the first British cryptographer to decipher a message 
encoded by a German Enigma coding machine while he was working at the Government Code and Cipher School 
(GC&CS) at Bletchley Park during the Second World War.  For further details see the Times obituaries column, 
November 24, 2004. 
13 The previous location having been Broadway Buildings, 54 Broadway, London. 
14 They increased the number of possible rotors from three to five meaning that instead of there being just six ways 
to arrange the rotors in a three rotor Enigma machine there were now sixty.   
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Poles in July 1939 (Hodges, 1992 p.175)  and it was late 1939 before R.V. Jones15 suggested to 
Edward Travis16 marking or punching  
“a paper or film in any one of 26 positions, corresponding to the letter 
coming out of the machine…. and to run the resulting record past a 
battery of photocells, so that each could count the number of times of 
occurrence of the letter that it was looking for.  After a given total count 
had been achieved,  the frequency distribution between the letters could 
be compared with the one appropriate to the language, which could 
have been set up on some kind of template.”(Jones, 1978) 
This very promising idea led to a positive meeting with Turing but although strikingly similar to 
the approach later used by Colossus, the mechanised attack on Enigma embodied by the British 
version of the Bomba, the BTM Bombe, was founded on the search for logical consistency based 
on hypothesising a “crib” or probable word in the originating plain text.    
The first Bombe, based on Turing's original design17, arrived at Bletchley Park in March 1940 
and was encouragingly named "Victory". The machine was successful to such an extent that by 
the late Spring of 1945, there were some two hundred and eleven Bombes in service, requiring a 
staff approaching two thousand to meet their operational needs.18  
The Bombe was designed for a single purpose and was not, it should be stressed, a universal 
Turing machine. But if “On computable numbers” marked the first theoretical step in a process 
then the success of the Bombe, by encouraging further development of cryptanalytic machinery, 
represented an important engineering first step.   The dance which had started with a throwaway 
remark of Newman’s in the Spring of 1935 was now gathering pace and the remaining steps, 
which would take another eight years to culminate in the first successful run of the Manchester 
Small Scale Experimental Machine (SSEM) or “Baby”, would each involve Turing, Newman or 
both.  This observation is not intended to detract from the vital roles played, in various 
developments, by other leading figures which were, naturally, of great importance.   
Turing’s contribution to the theory of computing is now so widely-regarded as singular that it is  
worth sounding a cautionary note about assuming that his contemporaries read, understood or 
were directly influenced by his published work.  The documentary record suggests that Turing’s 
writing only really came to be seen as important some years after his death in 1954 and long after 
the first real computers were built.  Such  effect as he had on the early development of the stored-
program computer appears to have been accomplished either directly by means of personal 
contact or indirectly through friends and colleagues.  In consequence, it is likely that we will 
never be in a position to say with any degree of precision exactly what impact Turing had on the 
early development of computers.   
Whatever tendency there may be to exaggerate Turing’s role there is a tendency of at least equal 
strength to under-estimate the part played by his lifelong friend Max Newman   Newman’s often  
                                                 
15 Reginald Victor Jones went on to solve a number of tough Scientific and Technical Intelligence problems during 
World War II and is generally known today as the "father of S&T Intelligence" (See Clark, 2007). 
16 Edward Wilfred Harry Travis became the director of Bletchley Park during World War II. At the time of this 
exchange he was deputy to Alexander Guthrie (Alastair) Denniston. 
17 Without Gordon Welchman’s  diagonal board improvement which was not implemented for another five months. 
18 In addition to the machines installed at Bletchley Park there were five Bombe “outstations” located at  Adstock, 
Eastcote, Gayhurst, Stanmore, and Wavendon.  
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understated manner and admirable aversion to claiming credit for his achievements left him 
vulnerable to being thought of as much less prominent in the history of post-war British 
computing than ought to be the case. 
Newman was not an early recruit to Bletchley Park.  The initiative appears to have come from 
Patrick Blackett who wrote to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral John Henry 
Godfrey, on the 13th May 1942 recommending Newman as 
 
 “… one of the most intelligent people I know, being a first-class pure 
mathematician, an able philosopher, a good chess player and musician,” 
(Blackett, 1942 p.2) 
 
In the early Autumn of 1942 Newman took up his post as a Senior Assistant assigned to  Major 
G.W. (Gerry) Morgan’s research section and was assigned to the “Testery” which was a sub-
section under Major Ralph Tester, applying hand methods to decrypting so called “Fish”19 
signals.  This was not a task to which Newman felt well suited and he was actively considering a 
return to Cambridge when he saw the possibility of automating one of the techniques (Banks, 
1996 p.8).  The approach in question relied on complex statistical methods the effective 
application of which would require the building of machines.  Newman took the idea to Travis, 
whose approval to set up a new section (known afterwards as the ‘Newmanry’) was secured 
quickly, and before the Winter of 1942, contacts were made in the Post Office with a view to 
securing the services of electrical engineers to undertake the project which eventually came 
under the leadership of the Telecommunications Research Establishment’s (TRE) engineer 
Charles Eryl (C.E.) Wynn-Williams. 
 
The first machines, known as Robinsons, were delivered to Newman’s Hut F by April 1943.  
Although producing some valuable results, the Robinsons were not sufficiently reliable nor were 
they fast enough in operation for the demands of cryptanalytic work in the Bletchley Park 
context.  The essential technical problem was that they made use of a pair of long paper tapes, 
the passage of which through Robinson needed to be synchronised.  This was a task which 
proved beyond the skills of the engineers to accomplish.  A different approach was required and 
a possible way forward was suggested by Post Office engineer, Tommy Flowers before the first 
Robinsons had even been assembled.  The kernel of his idea was to store one of the paper tapes 
(containing the Fish key-patterns) electronically, thereby doing away with the need for 
synchronisation.  In practice,  this would require the simultaneous and reliable deployment of a 
colossal number of thermionic valves. Such a proposal ran counter to the general understanding 
at the time that valves were prone to breakdown at a rate which would render any attempt at such 
large-scale co-ordinated use of valves doomed to failure.20  Flowers was confident however and 
Newman, in what must have seemed a reckless move at the time,  lent his support to the 
proposal, effectively overruling the concerns of the both the builder of the Bombe, Harold ‘Doc’ 
Keen and of the Robinson, Wynn-Williams.   Even with Newman’s backing the plan failed to 
secure official support from Bletchley Park.  Undeterred, Flowers effectively bypassed Bletchley 
Park, obtaining approval instead from Gordon Radley, the Director of the Dollis Hill Research 
Station.   Working closely with Sydney Broadhurst and William Chandler, Flowers then set 
about the process of design and construction of what is widely acknowledged today as the 
world’s first working digital electronic computer.   The rapidity and effectiveness with which 
Flowers’ team successfully completed their task was quite remarkable.  The process of 
                                                 
19 German High Command ciphers produced by Lorenz machines.  These devices employed an encryption scheme 
more complicated even than that used by Enigma. 
20 Exactly the same concerns were raised against Presper Eckert’s plan for the ENIAC. 
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construction was begun in February 1943 and in a little less than a year the Colossus was up and 
running at Bletchley Park.   
 
Turing was aware of these developments and may have discussed some initial ideas with Flowers 
even before Newman, but it is difficult to gauge the extent to which he played an active part in 
the detailed development of Colossus.  Turing did visit Flowers at Dollis Hill and had 
discussions there about Colossus but appears to have had very little input at meetings held at  
Bletchley Park.  The National Archives hold a number of photographs of the Colossus 
accompanying which is a caption, by Benjamin, fairly summarising the roles of the principal 
players: 
 
“The requirement for the machine was formulated by Professor M.H.A. 
Newman and the development was undertaken by a small team led by T.H. 
Flowers.  A Turing was working in the same department at that time, and 
his earlier work had its full influence on the design concept.”(The National 
Archives, 1943) 
 
Newman’s Character and Managerial Style 
 
It is perhaps appropriate here to discuss briefly the character and managerial style of Newman as 
this discussion will play a part in understanding better the nature and extent of his involvement in 
the British comput ing scene in the immediate post-war period.   
 
At first contact Newman was perhaps a little austere but his manner was generally affable and 
occasionally playful.  Speaking in 1975, Jack Good recalled that:   
 
“Typical of his quiet wit, in the face of wartime delays, was his topological 
comment, “It’s wonderful how many different shapes the neck of a bottle 
can take.” (Evans, 1976h) 
 
Newman ran his section at Bletchley Park with patriarchal authority but in a democratic spirit in 
accordance with which his staff were always encouraged to speak up if they thought him 
mistaken.  Having something of the force of nature about him and possessed of considerable 
intellectual daring, he demanded, and generally got, the impossible both from situations and  
people.  According to Donald Michie, Newman drove his section with “vigour and certitude, 
seemingly as a vehicle without reverse gear”(Michie, 2001). 
 
Under his leadership originality flourished. The successes of his team, in which he took great 
pleasure, were not the result of detailed micro-management but came about by finding people in 
whom he could place his trust and then allowing them to work according to their own judgment.  
This freed Newman to concentrate on the larger managerial and organisational issues in the 
service of which he displayed an “unerring sense of direction in a broader-brush landscape of 
which [his staff]  often had no inkling.  Over time his persistence towards a perceived goal 
would fructify in a stunning coup.” (Michie, 2001). 
 
An illustrative example of Newman’s democratic management style was his famous ‘Tea Party’ 
book ,  
“in which anyone was encouraged to write anything - mainly technical 
schemes, analyses and suggestions. Additionally one was free to make the 
entry ‘There will be a Tea Party on .... at ....’, and the discussions then 
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occurring at the said meeting were minuted, including decisions and action 
items with report-back dates. If  [Newman]   were out of town, or for any 
other reason, unable to attend, he simply had to read the new stuff and 
abide by it until or unless it was overtaken by new and subsequent 
decisions.” (Michie, 2001). 
 
His tolerance of democracy and debate notwithstanding, Newman was certainly quite prepared to 
put an end to discussion when it had served its purpose and he had settled on his course. 
 
“People who incline on occasion to be peremptory usually cover up thereby 
some inner lack of confidence. In Max's case the reverse was true. His 
confidence in his own judgment (including his judgment of his own strengths 
and weaknesses) was serene. From such a being, peremptoriness is that of a 
god. Moreover here was a god who was pro-active in empowering his 
servants. 
 
Max Newman was an Olympian. Those years supplied fuel and navigational 
systems for my own life voyage, - and I am sure for many, many others.” 
(Michie, 2001) 
 
Turing seen from the perspective of Bletchley Park  
 
Turing’s personal manner was always more challenging than that of Newman with the result that  
reactions to him are somewhat varied.  Shy and somewhat isolated, Newman recalled that; 
 
“… he emerged rather slowly as an outstanding man and it was this paper 
that he then wrote about this machine which lifted him into the first rank, as 
a purely technical mathematician he was not really among the first 
mathematicians in the world. …  he had this extraordinary idea of a 
computable function which has been the basis of a great deal of 
mathematical logic since that time.”(Evans, 1975) 
 
One fairly consistent theme which emerges is of Turing as a kind and thoughtful man who often 
went to enormous pains to choose Christmas and birthday presents.  No-one was in any doubt 
about his fearsome intellect.  Interviewed in 1976, Good described Turing in the following terms 
 
“He was a kindly person I’d say and a very very intelligent person with 
a depth of thinking.  His I.Q. was only about half way up the 
undergraduate standard and that convinced me that the I.Q. was a 
measure of speed of thinking and not depth.  That single example was 
sufficient as far as I was concerned.  He was very excitable and in 
discussions he would often prevent you from talking by saying “Ah!” 
between sentences continually saying “Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah! Ah!”.  I don’t 
know if you knew him yourself…”(Evans, 1976h) 
 
From his earliest involvement with computing, Turing seems to have had a clear appreciation 
that computers could use number to represent something other than quantity.  This was by no 
means as obvious a notion then as it may seem today and, as we shall see later, even von 
Neumann was slow to appreciate the possibility of computers as anything other than ‘number 
crunchers’.  Repeatedly at Bletchley Turing discussed ways in which computers could come to 
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embody genuine intelligence, and Turing is properly thought of as the founding father of 
artificial intelligence. 
 
“Turing believed that the embodiment in electronic devices of the 
fundamental ideas in the mathematics of computation with which he was 
earlier associated could be used as an instrument for simulating and 
possibly eventually surpassing the human brain.… I was one of the group of 
young people who were tremendously inspired by his ideas but the general 
run of scientists and mathematicians in that community simply regarded this 
as a rather regrettable aberration in a very fine mathematical brain that 
was contaminated by this deplorable streak of science fiction!” (Evans, 
1976c) 
 
Certainly Turing was, for much of the time, a very difficult man and anecdotes abound of him 
breaking off discussions and walking away without another word if he felt that the attention of 
his interlocutor had wandered.  This was an aspect of his personality which seems to have 
become more exaggerated as he got older.  There was another side to Turing though, and not 
everyone found him problematic.  As Tommy Flowers recalled: 
 
“… we didn't find him difficult. Probably because we were the subservient 
people, we were the people who were doing things for him so we didn't get 
into argument with him. I think that part of his incoherence was due to a 
speech impediment, or I don't know if it was an impediment in his speech so 
much as in his mind. I think… his mind was tumbling over faster than he 
could get the words over and he would go “a .... a.... a... ” and break off in 
sentences and sometimes you had to listen very carefully and integrate 
several sentences before you knew what he was talking about. …I think that 
the trouble with a lot of people was that they couldn't listen carefully 
enough. Well if you listened carefully enough and perhaps put one or two 
questions he was very coherent… and we got on with him very well.” 
(Evans, 1976j) 
 
The Bletchley Park Experience and Preparations for Post-war Computing Activity 
 
Presumably nothing could have been further from Newman’s mind when he first came to 
Bletchley Park than that he should within a few years have left forever mathematics at 
Cambridge and moved to a provincial university, the principal attraction of which was the 
possibilities it offered to build a computer (Whitehead, 1946).  Colossus changed everything and 
almost as soon as he had seen it in action, Newman began to lay plans to start work on another 
computer once the war had ended.  Once again Patrick Blackett played an important role in 
shaping Newman’s career.  The Fielden Chair of Mathematics at the University of Manchester 
was vacant and Blackett was determined that Newman should put in for the post.  Tempting 
though the prospect must have been, the decision to accept cannot have been simple.  Newman’s 
wife Lyn was appalled at the prospect of  giving up “Cross Farm & our cold but wide & bright 
skies for the perpetual gloom of Manchester”(L. Newman, 1945)21.   For a fortnight or so during 
February 1945 Lyn resisted the move but matters seem to have come to a head on the 24th 
February when the Blacketts and Henry Whitehead came to stay at Cross Farm. Lyn’s opposition 
lasted another four days but in the end she capitulated. 
                                                 
21 See also (W. Newman, 2002). 
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“The Blacketts were determined he should come & Patrick got at that 
always sensitive place, pride in a husband’s career – he said if Max chose 
to take a back seat in Cambridge still, another would gladly step in.”(L. 
Newman, 1948)  
 
Newman was of course not the only person in the Newmanry sent in an entirely unexpected post-
war direction as the result of contact with Flowers’ remarkable machine.  Donald Michie went on 
to become a major figure in the emerging field of machine learning,  Jack Good and David Rees 
continued their association with Newman and joined him for a time at Manchester.  It is perhaps 
a little less well known that Henry Whitehead very nearly left Oxford for a chair at Bristol 
expressly to take advantage of the opportunities to mechanise their mathematics department.  He 
imagined an alliance with the physicist Nevill Mott at Bristol, to mirror that of Blackett’s 
relationship with Newman and which would form the nucleus of  joint activities between Bristol 
and Manchester (Whitehead, 1946).   On the engineering side, Coombs, Chandler and 
Broadhurst  all went on to develop computers in the years following the end of hostilities.22 
 
By 1945, Turing’s post war trajectory was, like Newman’s, fairly clear.  According to his 
mother’s account, Turing had, for the previous year at least, been discussing 
 
 “his plans for the construction of a universal computer and of the service 
such a machine might render to psychology in the study of the human 
brain”(E. S. Turing, 1959) 
 
His ideas came together in his 1945 report “Proposed Electronic Calculator”23 which although  
pre-empted to some extent by the von Neumann’s draft EDVAC report (Neumann, 1945) 
arguably owes nothing to it and goes far beyond it in scope and conception. 24  Turing’s proposed 
machine was by no means to be restricted to routine calculation as is illustrated by the following 
list of problems, all but one of which he took to be within its repertoire: 
 
1. The construction of range tables 
2. To find the potential distribution outside a charged conducting cube 
3. The solution of simultaneous liner equations 
4. The calculation of radiation from the open end of a rectangular 
wave guide 
5. The performance matrix multiplication where the terms are 
polynomials 
6. The calculation of the response to given input signals in complicated 
electrical circuits. 
7. It would not be possible to integrate the area under a curve (due to 
input restrictions). 
8. Counting the number of butchers due to be demobilised (working 
from Army records) 
9. Finding the solution for a simple jigsaw problem. 
10. From a given Chess position, to calculate all the winning positions 
for three moves on either side. 
                                                 
22 Coombs and Chandler developed MOSAIC (Ministry of Supply Automatic Computer) and Broadhurst led the 
development of ERNIE (Electronic Random Number Indicator Equipment). 
23 Available in Carpenter B.E. & Doron R.W. (1986). 
24 For an excellent discussion see Carpenter B.E. & Doron R.W. (1986). 
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This was to be computing in the modern sense.  Turing’s report thus marks a clear break with the 
notion of computing as ‘number crunching’ and points confidently to a conception of the  
computer as a universal machine.   
 
The Manchester Engineers 
 
Nearly all of the people who played a part in the early development of computers at Manchester 
had a Cambridge mathematics background in common. The senior figure in this group was Max 
Newman who taught Alan Turing and David Rees, both of whom went from Cambridge to 
Bletchley Park where they came into contact with Jack Good - lately of Jesus College.  Tom 
Kilburn and Geoff Tootill, whose wartime service was spent at the Telecommunications 
Research Establishment,25 had also been students of Newman’s at Cambridge.    
 
The exception to the rule of Cambridge mathematics was Professor F.C. (Freddie) Williams. A 
lifelong  engineer, and famously disdainful of mathematics, Williams was, when he took up the 
Edward Stocks Massey chair of electro-technics in 1946, a major figure in Electrical Engineering 
with a considerable international reputation. 
 
Williams started his university career in 1929 at Manchester’s Department of Engineering which 
he entered on a Matthew Kirtley scholarship and where he graduated in 1932, with First Class 
honours and as winner of the Fairbairn prize.  The following year was spent very profitably 
working towards a master’s degree under the direction of Frank Roberts. Next Williams 
embarked on what was intended to have been a two year stint with the Metropolitan-Vickers 
Electrical Company Ltd., as a college apprentice.  In the event, he left after just twelve months 
having accepted the offer of an IEE Ferranti Scholarship to Magdalen College, Oxford.  
Williams worked with Eric Moullin at the engineering laboratories and, in 1936, was awarded a 
DPhil.  Then it was back to Manchester to take up the offer of an Assistant Lectureship in his old 
department.   The following few years were extremely productive and resulted in the publication 
by Williams of around twenty academic papers.  It was almost certainly during this period of 
ferocious activity that Williams first came into contact with computation, and with Patrick 
Blackett with whom he wrote a paper on an automatic curve follower for the Hartree Differential 
Analyser (Anderson, 2007).  Thus it was that Williams’ active involvement with mechanical 
calculation26 actually began somewhat earlier than the others.  In 1939 Williams was awarded a 
DSc by the University of Manchester. 
 
                                                 
25 For ease of presentation the term TRE (Telecommunications Research Establishment) is employed consistently 
throughout this piece to refer to an organisation which underwent considerable change during the period under 
investigation.  The detailed actual picture is quite complicated.  In 1935-36 the Air Ministry set up the Bawdsey 
Research Station (BRS) which in 1938 became the first operational ‘CH’ (Chain Home) early warning radar station.  
At the outbreak of  the war, BRS moved to Dundee and was renamed the Air Ministry Research Establishment 
(AMRE).  In 1940, AMRE was moved to Worth Matravers (Swanage) and was renamed TRE.  In 1942, TRE moved 
to Malvern College. After the war, in 1946, TRE was moved to the former HMS Duke where in 1953 it was merged 
with the Radar Research and Development Establishment (RRDE) to form the RRE.  In 1957, RRE was renamed the 
Royal Radar Establishment.  At around the time this interview was recorded in 1976, the RRE ceased to exist as an 
independent entity when it merged with the Signals Research and Development Establishment (SRDE) and the 
Services Electronics Research Laboratory (SERL) to become the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment (RSRE).   
In 1991 an expanded Malvern became a founding member of the Defence Research Agency (DRA) which in 1995 
in turn became a division of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA). The latest in this long series of 
changes occurred in 2001 when DERA split into the Defence Science and Technology Laboratories (Dstl) and 
QinetiQ.  
26 The Hartree Analyser was, of course, an analogue device rather than a digital machine. 
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Recruited by Blackett, Williams spent the war at TRE where he made important contributions to 
the electronics of radar, the development of IFF27 and to airborne interception systems.  By 1942, 
Williams had become a very influential figure within TRE and headed a small group whose 
principal job was to solve problems which had proved beyond the powers of other groups both 
within the organisation and more widely.   
At the end of hostilities, Williams was invited by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) Radiation Laboratory to co-edit two of the volumes in their twenty-four volume series on 
Electrical Engineering.  Williams was both literally and metaphorically writing the book on his 
discipline. 
It was in connection with the MIT series that Williams made a couple of visits to the USA in 
1945 and 1946 during one of which he saw ENIAC and first learned of attempts to use cathode 
ray tubes (CRT) for data storage. Williams, whose attention was fixed on radar, took no 
immediate interest in computation.  This changed after he returned to England.  As he explained  
in his 1976 interview with Chris Evans :  
“the problem [of computer storage] was quite simply brought to my notice 
and it was up to me then to either take an interest in it or not take an 
interest in it.  It seemed quite a serious challenge.  I knew nothing about 
any other attempts that were going on to produce storage, so one made a 
few enquiries of the people who had brought the problem to me and they 
enumerated, for example, the mercury delay line store as being a 
possibility.  Fortunately for me, I suppose, during my immediately 
previous visit to the United States, I’d seen some work at the Radiation 
Laboratory using storage on cathode ray tubes for the purpose of echo 
cancellation in radar - to record one trace and use that to cancel the fixed 
echoes in a second trace.  Now this had failed, but in the process of doing 
experiments certain properties of cathode ray tube surfaces had been 
exposed and they themselves had, I believe, thought, certainly Eckert and 
Mauchly had thought about the possibility of using cathode ray tubes.” 
(Evans, 1976e) 
 
Williams doesn’t say who might have brought the problem of computer storage to his notice but 
the possibilities are fairly limited.  Around the time in question the National Physical Laboratory 
(NPL), were trying to secure the services of electrical engineers to build the Automatic 
Computing Engine (ACE) and Blackett and Newman were also looking for engineers to 
construct a machine at Manchester.  Williams indicates elsewhere that he was already active “in 
the computer field” when first approached by Newman so it was almost certainly NPL who made 
the initial approach.  John Womersley, Superintendent of NPL’s  recently-formed Mathematics 
Division, contacted TRE on the 8th May 1946 enquiring about the state of research there into 
mercury delay lines.  The approach was probably made at Turing’s suggestion.  By the 13th 
August, NPL had received an encouraging response with Williams indicating a ‘strong interest’ 
in the problem of storage.   The enumeration of other alternative possibilities for computer 
storage, to which Williams refers, is likely to have been the same list which Turing gives in the 
ACE report and from which it was in all likelihood taken. Options mentioned there included 
                                                 
27 ‘Identification  - Friend or Foe’ which enables radar operators to make the critical distinction between  friendly 
and enemy aircraft. 
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punched paper tapes (as used in Colossus), acoustic delay lines, electric delay lines, magnetic 
tape and storage tubes.  Turing concludes that: 
 
“Much the most hopeful scheme, for economy combined with speed, seems 
to be the ‘storage tube’ or iconoscope (in J. v. Neumann’s terminology). 
 
…In an iconoscope as used in television a picture of a scene is stored as a 
charge pattern on a mosaic, and is subsequently read by scanning the 
pattern with an electronic beam.  The electron beam brings the charge 
density back to a standard value and the charge lost by the mosaic 
registers itself through its capacity to a ‘signal plate’ behind the mosaic.  
The information stored in this way on an iconoscope, using a 500 line 
system, corresponds to a quarter of a million digits.   
 
…It seems probable that a suitable storage system can be developed 
without involving any new types of tube, using in fact an ordinary cathode 
ray tube with tin-foil over the screen to act as a signal plate. 
 
…None of this involves any fundamental difficulty, but no doubt it will 
take time to develop” (A. M. Turing, 1946) 
 
Having had storage tubes identified to him as potentially the most attractive combination of 
speed and economy it is hardly surprising that Williams declined to interest himself in mercury 
delay lines but preferred instead to direct his considerable skill at making storage tubes a 
practical reality.  Williams was used to tackling the engineering problems that others could not 
solve and this must have seemed an ideal opportunity to launch his post war career.  Williams 
and Kilburn managed to solve the engineering problems involved in realising this ‘hopeful 
scheme’ with commendably little delay. 
Tom Kilburn was a convert to engineering.  He had started out as something of a mathematical 
specialist having been allowed, by his headmaster at Wheelwright's Grammar school, Dewsbury, 
to study almost nothing else from around the age of fourteen.   In 1940, Kilburn went up to 
Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge with a State, a Dewsbury Major and an Open Scholarship.  In 
1942, at the end of a shortened course, he graduated with First Class Honours in the 
Mathematical Tripos.  During the war, many Cambridge mathematics dons were absent from the 
university serving at Bletchley Park and elsewhere.  In spite of this privation, Cambridge still 
boasted a lively mathematical community in which Kilburn played his part.  As the Sidney 
Sussex college representative in a sub-group of Cambridge University Mathematical Society 
known as the New Pythagoreans, Kilburn would almost certainly have come into contact with a 
number of people who would later go on to play a part in the development of computing.  Geoff 
Tootill28 and Gordon Welchman29 were, like Kilburn, officers of the New Pythagoreans.  
Speakers to the student society included future Bletchley Park code breakers M.H.A. Newman30, 
K. J. Le Couteur and W.T. Tutte. 
However, one figure into whose orbit Kilburn would not have come was Alan Turing, whose 
departure to Bletchley Park in 1939 happened too soon for them to have met.  Nor would 
                                                 
28 Christ’s College representative for the New Pythagoreans and  President of the Archimedeans. 
29 Honorary Vice-President.  Welchman was also from Sydney Sussex College. 
30 Kilburn and Tootill were also students in classes given by Newman. 
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Kilburn, whose mathematical inclination was more applied than pure, have been likely to have 
read “On Computable Numbers” as an undergraduate:  
“….pure mathematics seemed extremely abstract. I was the sort of person 
who was always prepared to accept that two and two are four, whereas I’d 
spent the first term at Cambridge in one of Newman’s lectures proving 
that this was so.  Whilst it was all very interesting – I mean one could 
appreciate the beauty of it – it left me rather cold.  At the end of it, you 
didn’t seem to be much further forward…” (Bowker & Giordano, 1993 
pp.18-19) 
In light of his youth when he solved the Entscheidungsproblem, and the sheer magnitude of his 
achievement, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Turing’s name and something of his 
reputation (if only as a recent Smith’s prize winner31) ought to have been known to someone as 
active in the mathematical community as Kilburn just as it was to Jack Good (Evans, 1976h).32  
However, speaking in 1976, Kilburn recalled: 
“I know now that Turing published, I believe in ‘36, a Ph.D. on digital 
computers but at that time I was fifteen. I’d never heard of Turing until 
1947 perhaps.” (Evans, 1976k) 
Some time during his last year at Cambridge, Kilburn attended a talk by C.P. Snow33 who was 
visiting universities recruiting people for unspecified war work.  As Kilburn engagingly 
recounts, he had some fairly clear ideas about what he wanted to do for the war effort: 
“It seems silly but if I could have joined the RAF as a pilot, I would have 
done that, but I was relegated to navigator or some such, and that was not 
quite so appealing. It sounds egotistical but I like to lead. I like to be in 
charge and I didn’t fancy the idea of being driven and crashed by some 
other character.  I wanted to do my own driving and crashing. It’s on these 
sorts of whims that life is founded – it’s not through any profound thought is 
it? You take advantage of what’s there at the time.” (Bowker & Giordano, 
1993 p.17) 
After leaving Cambridge, Kilburn enrolled on a number of short courses in electronics followed 
by a six-week City and Guilds course on electricity, magnetism and electronics. After a break of 
around a week, Kilburn was posted to TRE where, as a mathematician,  he was not met with 
unbridled enthusiasm.  Williams had requested an extra person to join his team and Kilburn was 
the person they had sent.  The other members of Williams’ team were all around 30 years old 
with an average of 10 years experience in practical electronics.   Kilburn was aged just 21 and 
prior to being called up had not the least interest in electronics or electronic equipment of any 
                                                 
31 The Smith’s Prize was set up to foster an interest in the study of applied mathematics and consequently should 
have been of interest to Kilburn – even if only to the extent of being acquainted with the names of recent recipients.  
For an excellent discussion of the Smith’s Prize see Barrow-Green, J., “A Corrective to the Spirit of too Exclusively 
Pure Mathematics: Robert Smith (1689-1768) and his prizes at Cambridge University”, Annals of Science, 56 
(1999) pp.271-316. 
32 Even Good, himself a winner of the Smith’s Prize in 1940,  had not actually read Turing before the war. 
33 Charles Percy Snow, Baron Snow of Leicester.  Originally trained as a chemist at Leicester and a physicist at 
Cambridge, Snow was at the time of this talk, mid way through his four years of service as technical director of the 
ministry of labour. 
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kind.  Williams was not impressed with the latest addition to his team and made no attempt to 
hide his disappointment: 
“… in effect he said ‘Oh God, you don’t know anything?’ and I said ‘No.’.  
That was the sort of relationship at the start.  But of course by the time we 
left Malvern – that was four years later – the relationship was quite 
different.” (Bowker & Giordano, 1993 p.18) 
In trying to come to a balanced assessment of the contribution made by Kilburn to the 
development of the first stored program computer at the University of Manchester, the historian 
is faced with a difficult task. With each of the other principal figures it is relatively simple to 
trace when they first became interested in digital computation and to discern the intellectual roots 
out of which their interest grew and developed.   Pinning down when exactly Kilburn first 
became aware of digital computation or first began to think in detail about the design of digital 
computing machinery is somewhat more complicated.  The situation is far from improved by 
Kilburn’s own recollections which actually add to the confusion by appearing to rule out almost 
every possible account without offering any alternative explanation.   
Kilburn stressed in a number of interviews that he was not familiar with the corpus of published 
work available at the time of the Manchester development.  However, an apparent lack of 
familiarity either with von Neumann’s “First draft of the report on the EDVAC” or Turing’s 
“Proposed Electronic Calculator” does not appear to have acted as any sort of impediment to 
him.  Indeed both reports were, in Kilburn’s estimation, fairly irrelevant for an engineer:  
“All you needed to know… is that the computer has a store which is 
alterable, that it goes through a program in order, and that it does its 
computing in an arithmetic unit.  You don’t need to know anything else.  
Right?  Where I got this knowledge from I’ve no idea.” (Bowker & 
Giordano, 1993 p.20) 
Nor did Kilburn have any use for the theoretical description of the computer outlined in  “On 
Computable Numbers” or for mathematical concepts in general: 
“I’d never read Turing’s papers but you don’t need, for example, the Turing 
machine.  It’s irrelevant.  It’s a mathematical concept… but not of much 
interest to me” (Bowker & Giordano, 1993 p.20) 
Kilburn acknowledges that he was aware, around 1945, of the development of mercury delay 
lines34 but does not appear to have had any active involvement in digital computing prior to 
1947.  Nevertheless he appears to have had, by that time, some very clear ideas on how computer 
development should take place even if he was less certain exactly how these ideas had first 
occurred to him: 
“Between early 1945 and early 1947, in that period, somehow or other I 
knew what a digital computer was, I knew how I would build it, and I knew 
how I wouldn’t be building it” (Bowker & Giordano, 1993 p.20) 
                                                 
34 Presumably this knowledge came via F.C. Williams who, as we have seen, also became aware of these 
developments at around the same time. 
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If Kilburn’s thinking on computer design was as mature by 1947 as he appears to be suggesting 
then he gave no sign of it at the time.  Certainly Williams appears not to have been aware of 
anything remotely approaching the suggested level of sophistication in Kilburn’s thinking prior 
to 1948.   Indeed, far from believing that Kilburn had already thought out in some detail how to 
implement a universal Turing machine as early as 1945, Williams recollection was that neither of 
them knew very much about computers until after they had made substantial progress on the 
CRT store.  Only then, by Williams’ account had they reached a point where a detailed 
understanding of computers was necessary.  Williams recalled in 1975, that it was Newman and 
Turing who first explained the basics of computation to the engineers: 
"With this store available, the next step was to build a computer around it. 
Tom Kilburn and I knew nothing about computers, but a lot about circuits. 
Professor Newman and Mr. A.M. Turing in the Mathematics Department 
knew a lot about computers and substantially nothing about electronics. 
They took us by the hand and explained how numbers could live in houses 
with addresses and how if they did they could be kept track of during a 
calculation. In addition, Professor Newman had a grant from the Royal 
Society.” (Williams, 1975 p.328) 
He repeats substantially the same account in his interview with Christopher Evans: 
“Now let’s be clear before we go any further, that neither Tom Kilburn 
nor I knew the first thing about computers when we arrived in 
Manchester University.  We knew that ... we’d had enough explained to 
us to understand what the problem of storage was and what we wanted 
to store, and that we’d achieved.  So the point now had been reached 
where we’d got to find out about computers.  Now we were very 
fortunate in this respect because we had in the University here, 
Professor Newman and Mr Turing, who were both very keen on 
computers and indeed Newman had already got a grant from the Royal 
Society to build a computer but had not in fact yet embarked on the 
problem of building it, nor indeed was Newman, who was a 
mathematician, the right sort of person to build the computer.  So it was 
a very fruitful opportunity for collaboration between the Maths 
Department and the Electrical Engineering Department.  And Newman 
explained the whole business of how a computer works to us, took him, I 
should think, all of half an hour.  So we went away and decided to build 
one” (Evans, 1976e) 
Some questions have been raised over the details of Williams’ account (Napper, 1998, Section 2) 
but it is clear that the general sequence of events outlined by Williams, in which precise 
consideration of computer design was deferred until the problem of storage had been solved, fits 
very well with the known chronology of the development of the Manchester Baby.  Up until the 
autumn of 1947 (probably October) nearly all the engineering effort was spent on getting the 
CRT store working reliably with 2048 bits.  During November, Kilburn prepared his progress 
report “A storage system for use with binary digital computing machines” which was completed 
by the 1st December.   In the last few months of 1947, Kilburn was concerned about thoroughly 
testing the CRT and, to that end, was beginning to work more seriously on the design of the 
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machine.  It is possible that there may have been breadboard35 construction during the same 
period.   
Kilburn, speaking to Chris Evans in 1976, confirms that no serious attention was paid to working 
on a computer until after the problem of storage had been solved: 
“EVANS So in ‘46 you came up to Manchester. Perhaps you could start 
absolutely at the beginning.  … were you immediately told what the 
nature of the problem was and what the goals were? 
 
KILBURN  Well whilst at RRE 36 some initial work had been done on 
cathode ray tube storage by Professor Williams37 and Ritson and they 
had succeeded in storing one digit.  And it was quite clear what the 
programme was, we were not immediately busy with the idea of building 
a computer, we were immediately busy in developing a cathode ray tube 
storage system which had a very important property over the mercury 
delay line in that it had what is now called immediate access to 
information.” (Evans, 1976k) 
Slightly later in the conversation Kilburn suggests that it was not apparent to him much before 
the middle of 1947 that  a computing machine was going to be built38. 
 
“… it was a very exciting time and there were a very small number of 
people involved who worked together very closely indeed.  Put in some 
very hard and continuous work and we just pressed on, and I wouldn’t 
be able to put a date on it, but by perhaps the middle of ‘47 or slightly 
earlier it was already apparent we were going to build a computing 
machine.  And I remember writing up, for the purposes of my Ph.D. to 
be submitted later, a design for the machine which we ... the prototype 
machine which we built in 1948 and which we reported as working in 
June 1948.  I remember that design being complete by about December 
‘47.  So, we rapidly moved from the phase that it was only a store that 
was the basis of the project to the state where we were certainly going to 
build a computer.”(Evans, 1976k) 
   
While detailed engineering work on the Baby probably did not begin until very late in 1947 or 
perhaps early 1948 it is clear that the mathematicians had been giving serious thought to the 
technical specification of the stored program computer for at least the previous eighteen months. 
 
It is also apparent from Good’s notes that from the start of 1947 they had been communicating 
their thinking on the subject to Kilburn.  One example of this dialogue and the influence it may 
                                                 
35 A breadboard is a reusable solderless prototype of an electronic circuit generally used for experimenting with 
circuit designs. 
36 Kilburn appears to have mis -spoken here.  He presumably meant the Telecommunications  Research 
Establishment (TRE) as the Radar Research Establishment (RRE) was not formed until 1953, some years after 
Williams had taken up his appointment at the Victoria University of Manchester.  
37 Williams filed the first patent associated with the CRT store in December 1946, a provisional patent for the 
single-bit store. 
38 I am indebted to Chris Burton for clarifying that the actual date was almost certainly around October 1947. 
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have had may be found in Appendix 1 where a suggested block diagram for the Baby (Appendix 
1, Fig.1) drawn by I.J. Good on the 3rd June 1947 is shown.  The diagram and a short report were 
passed in the first instance to Max Newman and David Rees who approved them with only minor 
modifications.  Newman passed Kilburn the material on the 10th June 1947.  The precise extent 
to which the diagram Kilburn included in his report to TRE (Appendix 1, Fig 2) owes an 
intellectual debt to the earlier work by Good is a matter for just the sort of internalist debate 
which is very common in the history of computing.  The temptation to pursue that line risks 
obscuring the much greater significance of Good’s notes as documentary evidence that the 
computer-building activity at Manchester was, in contrast to what the dominant historical 
discourse would have us believe, very much a collaborative effort between two communities of 
practice out of which a third and distinct community was about to emerge.  
 
The Two-project Myth 
 
The notion that in Manchester, immediately after the war, there were two distinct and separate 
projects to build a stored program digital computer, one led by Williams and the other by 
Newman represents an orthodoxy in British history of computing.  From  this stance Williams’ 
project is perceived as a triumph and the engineers emerge as heroic figures whereas, by 
contrast, Newman’s project is characterized as a failure and the mathematicians are, if mentioned 
at all, portrayed as marginal figures.  The two-project myth, reflects the dual nature of the 
computer (Mahoney, 1988) and is a central tenet of a wider professional mythology which has 
emerged as the dominant discourse in the history of British computing and within it the 
engineering or practical perspective is privileged while the mathematical or theoretical point of 
view is almost entirely excluded.     
 
There will not be space here to deal comprehensively with the dominant discourse as a whole or 
even to provide a full treatment of the two-project myth but a few comments are in order.  
 
An early statement of the two-project myth comes in Lavington’s short book “A History of 
Manchester Computers” (Lavington, 1998). 
 
“Newman and his mathematicians took no active role in the design of 
Manchester computers, but he did provide a general enthusiasm for the 
project…  In due course [the Newman]  project became merged with the 
Williams/Kilburn machine." (Lavington, 1998 pp.4-5) 
 
The assertion that the mathematicians took no active part in the design process is more complex 
than may, at first, be apparent and is clearly dependent on what precisely is meant by ‘active’ 
and ‘design’.  Williams’ recollection that neither he nor Kilburn knew the first thing about 
computers until 1947 when Newman and Turing explained to them how a computer works is 
prima facie evidence, coming from an engineering source, of at least one active contribution 
made by the mathematicians.  As we have seen, Good documented a number of other 
contributions to the SSEM design process and also recalls having had a hand in the general 
theoretical education of the engineers.  
 
“I was at Manchester, and concerned with computers, before the 
engineers F.C. Williams and Tom Kilburn arrived, and helped teach 
them a few things.” (Good, 1945-8) 
 
 Page 21 
Newman delivered, at Manchester in the immediate post war period, a series of lectures on 
computing which may have helped shape the understanding of the  engineers but may at the very 
least be thought of as constituting part of the ir computing education.  Moving outside the 
immediate Manchester circle, Turing and Wilkinson delivered, at the Ministry of Supply’s 
London Headquarters between late 1946 and early 1947,  a series of lectures on the design of the 
ACE.  Kilburn attended these lectures and whatever impact they may or may not have had on the 
subsequent design of  the SSEM, it is clear at least that Turing was, contrary to the impression 
which may have been left by Lavington, active ly disseminating ideas on computer design.  It is 
certain that as part of his attempt to interest Williams in working on computers – specifically as 
part of the Royal Society sponsored computing machine project, Newman would have had 
conversations of a substantive nature with Williams while the latter was still at TRE.  As noted 
above, NPL were also very keen to solicit Williams’ help to build the ACE and it is 
overwhelmingly probable that this would have involved a number of quite detailed exchanges, at 
least some of which would have involved Turing directly.39   
 
It is clear that over and above any detailed computer design work which may have been 
undertaken by Newman and the Manchester mathematicians before 1948,  they were, during the 
same period, also active in educating engineers to the point where they could engage 
constructively with the problem of building a computer.  Turing, who had mature computer 
design plans well before the Manchester engineers had even begun to think serious ly about 
computing, was similarly active in what we might today call knowledge transfer, via the NPL.  It 
is clear that any characterization of the mathematicians as passive enthusiasts runs counter to the 
available evidence. 
 
Of course, it is one thing to note that mathematicians within Manchester and more widely were 
active in stimulating an interest in computing per se, but quite another to show that they had a 
tangible effect on the design of the SSEM.  However, there is no reason why anyone should have 
ever expected mathematicians to be making that kind of contribution.  It is one of the 
shortcomings of Lavington’s account that it suggests that active involvement by mathematicians 
in the detailed circuit design of the SSEM is a pre-requisite for their being full partners in the 
project.  This is very much to see the world from the perspective of the drawing board or the 
soldering iron and it is important to recognize that what counts as ‘activity’ is critically 
dependent on one’s point of view.  
 
Consider how the Colossus was developed at Bletchley Park.  There, Newman, along with 
others, took great care to explain to Flowers and the Post Office engineers precisely what was 
required of the machine which needed to be produced.  This would have involved giving an 
explanation of enough by way of general principle as would be needed to let the engineers make 
progress.  In the case of Colossus, it would also have been necessary to provide detailed 
explanation of the precise statistical techniques which the machine was  to employ and an 
explanation of the sort of changes in German encryption techniques to which the machine might 
need to respond during its lifetime.  In spite of the general direction in which the flow of 
information was going, it would be a mistake to see even this stage of the development of the 
Colossus as involving active mathematicians and passive engineers.  It would be more accurate 
to think in terms of a joint endeavor.  Newman, as a mathematician and a cryptanalyst would 
have had a non-trivial job to draw up the project specification for Colossus while the engineering 
design and machine fabrication of the device would properly fall to others.  The specification for 
                                                 
39 For example, Williams went with  R.A. Smith and  A. Uttley to NPL on the 22nd November 1946 where they 
discussed the ACE project with Womersley and Turing.  It was this meeting that, in due course, resulted in 
Kilburn’s secondment to Manchester. 
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Colossus was not contrived in vacuo and Flowers and his team would constantly have been 
having to triangulate the ideas of the mathematicians onto the geography of the possible. The fact 
that the skills of a number of different professions needed to be brought to bear on the problem is 
no demonstration  that there were a number of different computing projects at Bletchley Park 
only one of which, Flowers project, was a success.  Similarly, even if it were the case that the 
Manchester mathematicians had absolutely no involvement in the detailed circuit design of the 
SSEM  it would do nothing to show that there were two different projects in existence, only one 
of which was a success.   
 
Lavington, who was himself trained as an Electrical Engineer  at the University of Manchester in 
the early 1960s before joining Kilburn’s MU5 high-performance design team, based his account 
substantially, and without further interpretation, on conversations with Williams, Kilburn and 
Tootill (Lavington, 2005).  It is reasonable to suppose that what I have so far been referring to as 
the Lavington account may be regarded as an accurate representation of the Manchester 
engineering perspective post-1960. 
 
The account offered, in 1993, by Croarken of the development of the SSEM correctly indicates 
that Williams’ main focus when he arrived at Manchester was the development of the CRT store:  
  
“TRE was willing to continue to support Williams' work on cathode-ray 
tube storage systems not only by seconding Kilburn but also by supplying 
Williams with the components necessary for him to carry out his 
research.” (Croarken, 1993 p.14)    
 
But Croarken begins to go slightly astray in characterizing Newman’s initial intentions and how his 
thinking altered after the arrival of Williams.  
 
“ In postwar Britain, such components were not readily available. Newman 
was pleased that Williams had been appointed and decided to wait for 
Williams' work to come to fruition rather than rely on buying 
components from the United States whenever they became available. 
Newman did not anticipate that Williams would produce a working 
memory unit in such a short time.” (Croarken, 1993 p.14) 
 
In fact, Newman, in his progress report on the computing machine project made to the Royal 
Society on the 20th December 1948 is quite clear that: 
 
“It was originally intended that, in order to have a machine ready for 
experimental work as soon as possible, one of the types already under 
construction in 1946 should be copied.  However when Mr. F.C. 
Williams was appointed to the Chair  of Electrical Engineering at 
Manchester in 1946, the design of the machine was naturally placed in 
his hands” (M. H. A. Newman, 1949 p.14) 
 
So Newman’s intention does not appear to have been to buy components40 but rather to make use 
of design ideas developed elsewhere to guide the fabrication of a facsimile (or near facsimile) at 
                                                 
40 This is not to deny certain key components, such as a memory device, might have been purchased complete from 
outside.  
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Manchester.  It ought, perhaps, to be stressed that this would have constituted a serious 
intellectual and engineering challenge demanding a high degree of skill and theoretical 
understanding.  The proposed activity would have been more or less on a par with the work of 
Wilkes at Cambridge.  Nor was Newman, as Croarken suggests, only interested in American 
developments but was prepared to make use of any available design.  In support of Newman’s 
plan, Rees was sent to the United States to familiarize himself with the work being done there 
while Good accompanied Newman on a visit to NPL where Turing explained his ideas for the 
ACE.  Evidently, Newman was not much taken with Turing’s lecturing style and quickly 
returned to Manchester, leaving Good to continue on his own.  Close contact was maintained 
thereafter between the Manchester mathematicians and NPL.   
 
Not only did Newman immediately place responsibility for the design of the Royal Society 
machine in Williams’ charge but  it was always his intention to delegate to an engineer the job of 
producing a detailed computer design.  Newman’s intention to delegate made it particularly 
important to find a person with the right balance of skills. Newman needed someone who could 
grasp the  difficult theoretical ideas involved and be able to translate these into circuitry.  In his  
1946 application for Royal Society funding, Newman put it thus:   
 
“Evidently the success of the enterprise would hang largely on the 
appointment of the designing engineer.  Although he would not be 
expected to provide the main ideas for projects, he would need a rare 
combination of wide practical experience in circuit design, with a 
thorough understanding of the abstract ideas involved.  It will be 
necessary to offer a good salary, up to say £800, to the right man.” 
(M. H. A. Newman, 1946b)  
 
After a great deal of searching, it was Blackett who suggested that Williams might be the man 
for the job (Randell, 1975 p.12).  Finding the right person to act as the designing engineer was 
obviously central to Newman’s plans but it was equally important that he be supported by 
mathematicians whose role it would be to develop and explain the main theoretical ideas which 
underpin computing.  Building a stored program digital computer would require a delicate 
bringing together of the abstract and the practical.  The engineering task would be to render the 
abstract ideas of the mathematicians into physical reality.   While he recognized the value of 
basic research on the principles of computer construction, Newman had an altogether different 
purpose in mind for his proposed machine.  His conception of the computer was as a device 
which would lead to the development of new types of mathematical solutions and prompt the 
creation of new techniques in mathematical analysis.  Newman did not see the computer as an 
end in itself, but as a tool which, if it was worth developing at all, had to do something.  
Williams’ conception was, and always remained, somewhat different as he explained to Chris 
Evans in 1976: 
 
“I’m an engineer, I defined the computer right from square one as being 
a device which was designed to facilitate the performance of 
mathematics, the greater part of which would be very much better not 
done.” (Evans, 1976e) 
 
Williams’ appointment did not mark the starting point of an independent computer-building 
project at Manchester but was rather an important milestone in the engineering of the Royal 
Society machine.  Following Newman’s plan, laid down the previous year, different aspects of 
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the project were being semi-autonomously managed by different specia list groups. In an echo of 
the Colossus development, primary responsibility for the machine specification and 
determination of the final use of the machine fell to the mathematicians.  The overall 
responsibility for the details of implementation belonged to the engineers.  This division of 
labour played to the strengths of the participants and would have made perfect sense to all 
parties.  As Williams told Randell in 1972: 
 
“Since he [Newman] understood computers and I understood 
electronics the possibilities of fruitful collaboration were 
obvious.”(Williams, 1972) 
 
As the initiator of the Royal Society supported computing project and the senior Professor, the 
overall leadership of the activity started out in Newman’s hands.  Over time, things changed.  
Within a few years it became clear that the future direction of the project was likely to be 
focused on engineering and would, in consequence, be better directed by an engineer.  In 
recognition of this, Newman withdrew from active involvement leaving the field to Williams and 
Kilburn.  Williams, who had little interest in computing, soon stepped back leaving the further 
development of computers at Manchester in Kilburn’s hands.   This period of transition marked 
was very important in the emergence of a new community of practice in Britain – computing – 
and Kilburn was in the perfect position to become one of its leading figures. 
 
Croarken’s observation that: 
 
“While the work in the Electro-Technics Department went on 
independently of the Royal Society Computing Machine Laboratory, the 
engineers did seek advice from Newman and his staff” (Croarken, 1993 
p.14) 
 
can now be seen as somewhat wide of the mark.  While it does recognize some role for the 
mathematicians, it fails to acknowledge the full significance of their contribution or pay 
sufficient attention to the overall context in which the project was being carried out.  The relative 
independence of the work of the engineers and the mathematicians was, in fact, more apparent 
than real.  Good’s notes, the existence of  which Croarken seems alone in recognizing41, give a 
tantalizing glimpse of the connections which actually existed between the engineers and 
mathematicians.  They impart a clear sense of an on-going dialogue between people working on 
different aspects of the same development. 
 
By the time we get to Burton’s account of the development of the SSEM (Burton, 2005), the 
Engineers are cast as entirely independent and, echoing Lavington’s narrative, the 
mathematicians are once again portrayed in the role of encouraging bystanders: 
 
“Although their work in the electrical engineering department was 
completely independent of outside influence, Williams and Kilburn were 
nevertheless encouraged by the Mathematics Department’s Max 
Newman, who secretly knew about the Colossus code-breaker machine 
and was familiar with the work of Alan Turing.  Newman wanted a 
computer in his department and could see that the Williams-Kilburn 
work might lead to one.” (Burton, 2005 p.46) 
                                                 
41 Croarken’s account of the development of the Baby is much the best of those considered here. 
 Page 25 
 
As we have seen, far from being independent of “outside influence” the engineers were working 
side by side with the mathematicians developing a specification for the proposed computer.  The 
bibliography of a report submitted by Kilburn to TRE (Kilburn, 1947) also attests to the fact that 
he, and presumably Williams, were aware of relevant written material pertaining to computing 
projects outside Manchester.42  The idea of the department of Electro-Technics as a self-
contained island of computing activity not only lacks substance but ignores the fact that  
Kilburn’s very presence in Manchester came about only as a result of TRE’s concern to retain a 
helpful connection with the NPL.   
 
 
The Financial Myth 
 
The claim that the SSEM enjoyed, from the outset, significant financial support from TRE in 
contrast to a complete or almost complete lack of financial assistance from Newman and the 
Royal Society until after the SSEM was complete, may be termed the financial myth. 
 
Lavington sets out the position in a fairly neutral way: 
 
“The Royal Society grant of £35,000 remained substantially intact for 
several years, eventually providing for the construction of a building to 
house the University's Ferranti Mark 1 computer in 1951.” (Lavington, 
1998) 
 
Croarken spells out matters a little more fully:  
 
“The Royal Society Computing Machine Laboratory housed Williams' 
and Kilburn's work on a prototype computer being built around the 
Williams tube store. In reality, the Royal Society Computing Machine 
Laboratory was a 20 x 20-foot room in the Engineering Department, 
labeled "Magnetism." The laboratory had no staff paid for by the Royal 
Society. Newman, Good (who left Manchester in April 1948), and Rees 
were based in, and employed by, the Mathematics Department. 
Williams, Robertson, and Tootill were on the staff of the Electro-
Technics Department. Kilburn was still a senior scientific officer with 
the Ministry of Supply. The equipment needed to carry out the research 
continued to be supplied through T RE.  Consequently, the Royal Society 
grant remained almost untouched.” (Croarken, 1993 p.15) 
 
Most recently, Burton highlights how Williams was not a beneficiary of any Royal Society 
funds.  
 
“Newman’s receipt of funds to establish a Royal Society Computing 
Machine Laboratory was not used by Williams (who was fully funded by 
the University and TRE), though he later appropriated the name as a tag 
for the Magnetism Room.” (Burton, 2005 p.46)   
 
Napper highlights the important role of the financial myth in supporting the two-project myth: 
                                                 
42 Kilburn refers to unpublished material by Turing and von Neumann. 
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“There is no question that the "Baby" was Williams' project not 
Newman's (and effectively funded by the TRE). The confusion is caused 
because Newman got a grant of £20000 capital + 5 * £3000 per year for 
wages to build a computer from the Royal Society in 1946. Also the 
room the Baby was built in was called the Royal Society Computing 
Machine Laboratory. I won't go into the full debate, but in my mind the 
empirical proof is in the University records, which show that "Royal 
Society" was stripped from the name after a year or two, and all the 
capital and the remaining half of the wages in Newman's grant was 
spent in 1950 on a new building to house the Ferranti Mark I - the 3rd 
generation of Williams' (and Kilburn's) computers !!” (Napper, 2004) 
 
There are two substantial defects which run through these narratives.  First, they generally fail 
correctly to represent how and where the Royal Society grant was actually spent.43   Secondly, 
they take no explicit notice of the details of Newman’s bid to the Royal Society or his estimate of 
expected costs, thereby ignoring the financial context.   
 
By January 1946, the university had indicated its strong support for Newman’s project but made 
it clear that this did not extend to a preparedness to provide the necessary financial support. At 
Blackett’s suggestion, Newman turned to the Royal Society for assistance.  He gave an outline 
description of how he saw the project progressing.  The plan he sketched owed a great deal to his 
experience leading the development of the Colossus at Bletchley Park.  The engineer would first 
need the problem to be explained in sufficient detail to permit work to begin but it is hardly 
without significance in the current context that Newman expected the mathematicians to work 
closely with the engineer thereafter.  It is hardly surprising that he hoped to enlist the support of 
Turing who was, by then, at the NPL, and Flowers who was still at the Post Office: 
 
“The following scheme is proposed.  The initial staff should be a circuit-
designing engineer, (full time), and two half-time mathematicians… The 
engineer, after sufficient preliminary discussions in Manchester to form 
some idea of the problem, should spent some weeks at Dollis Hill, 
gaining knowledge of the known techniques in the field.  Both he and the 
mathematicians should also spend some time in the N.P.L.  After this 
there would be a period of some months in which the skeleton design of 
a machine might emerge.  The rough draft would then go to Dollis Hill 
to be drawn out in detail and the machine would then be made… 
 
There would still remain the assembling of the machine, and getting it 
running, which would be done in Manchester.” (M. H. A. Newman, 
1946b) 
 
Newman’s approximate financial projections were as follows: 
 
“Estimated costs 
Obviously only very rough estimates are possible.   The timing is also 
liable to large variation either way 
 
                                                 
43 Croarken’s account is much the most nuanced and accurate of the narratives under consideration here. 
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Annual Expenditure       £ 
First Year:   Engineer    800 
   Two half-time mathematicians 500 
   Office and travel expenses    50 
                 1350 
 
Second Year: Engineer    800 
   Mathematicians   500 
   Half-time computer   200 
   Two maintenance men  500 
   Four extra maintenance men 
   (four months only)   350 
   Operator (six months)   125 
   Spare parts, upkeep of 
   laboratory, etc.   500  
                 2975 
 
Subsequent years - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  £3000   to    £3500” 
(M. H. A. Newman, 1946b) 
 
No detailed breakdown of costs is given for the construction of the machine beyond noting that 
the total cost would be £10,000 over the first three years and £20,000 over the first five years.  
There is no indication that the project was intended to come to an end after the fifth year and in 
the light of other comments he makes it seems reasonable to suppose Newman saw Manchester 
as staying at the forefront of computing over the long term.   
 
Newman makes budgetary provision for two half- time mathematicians but makes no allowance  
for his own salary presumably because felt he could direct the project in the time he had 
available after his departmental duties were complete.  Newman’s managerial style, which as we 
have seen, involved picking very capable lieutenants and giving them freedom to do their jobs 
without unnecessary interference, would have made this a realistic expectation. 
 
Newman also allowed £800 p.a. to secure the services of a full time engineer who, with the 
agreement of Prof. Willis Jackson.44 would have been attached to the department of Electro-
Technics.  A few months after Newman’s bid was submitted, events moved on and Jackson took 
up the Imperial College London Chair in Electrical Engineering vacated by the retirement of C. 
L. Fortescue. The departure of Jackson opened the way for his replacement by Williams,45 whose 
appointment, so meritorious on other grounds,  also brought a considerable indirect bonus to the 
project in purely cash terms.  Rather than having to be funded out of the Royal Society grant 
Williams’ salary was paid by the University of Manchester but it is reasonable to suppose that 
his attention would primarily have been directed to the day to day administration and 
organisation of his department.  The second cash bonus to the project came in the form of  the 
services of Tom Kilburn who rapidly became the de facto designing engineer for the SSEM 
project.  His salary (presumably on a par with that of a university lecturer) was fully paid by the 
TRE rather than needing to be met from Royal Society funds.   
                                                 
44 Willis Jackson was Williams’ predecessor as  Professor and departmental head of Electro-technics. 
45 Jackson’s appointment at Imperial was particularly ‘fortunate’ as someone of Williams’ standing could have 
hardly been tempted to Manchester to take up a less senior post.  At that time, the only Manchester department 
having two professors was Physics where both Hartree and Blackett held Chairs. It is most unlikely that a second 
Chair would have been created in Electro-technics had Jackson stayed in post. 
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Kilburn’s immediate enrolment on the Turing-Wilkinson lecture course was consistent with 
Newman’s original idea of educating the designing engineer in the known techniques in the 
computing field by spending some time at NPL.   
 
Whereas Newman had expected to spend £1300 during the first year of the project to cover 
salaries he ended up needing only £500.  In addition, approximately £300 was spent on sending 
Rees to the Moore School lectures (Royal Society, 1946b).  Allowing another £50 for 
miscellaneous spending, this would have brought the first year’s actual expenditure up to c.£850.  
TRE’s contribution would have been around £500 for Kilburn’s salary and a further £100 
(approximately) in donated components.   It is difficult to place an firm cash value on the 
hardware TRE supplied as it was mostly surplus stock which if it had appeared on the open 
market would have had a serious effect on prices  Consequently, it would almost certainly have 
been destroyed if it had not been given to Manchester46.  The department of Electro-Technics 
contributed some test equipment which they built in-house and a quantity of small consumables 
from their own stores.  Additionally they provided infrastructure e.g., floor space, drawing office 
facilities, workshop facilities.  In total we might nominally value this contribution as being worth 
£150.   
 
Newman made no explicit provision for spare parts, or the cost of components during the first 
year.  This may seem surprising at first glance and may be taken as indicating that he did not 
anticipate making speedy progress or that his intention was to meet the expense from the capital 
budget.  However a more likely explanation is that Newman anticipated being able to draw on a 
ready supply of components from the Colossus project.  In order to establish what would be 
needed Professor Willis Jackson was accompanied by Newman to Bletchley Park in the summer 
of 1945.  Writing on the 8th August (M. H. A. Newman, 1945), Newman formally endorsed 
Jackson’s recommendation that the material from two complete Colossi, plus “a few thousand 
miscellaneous resistances and condensers of other machines” should be made unrecognisable 
and shipped to Manchester.  Only the counter racks and ‘bedsteads’ were to be left intact.  A 
supplemental request that a punch and reader (Creed or Teletype) might also be included “if 
available”, was also made.47  On the 6th December 1945, an escorted consignment comprising 
between seven to nine tons of components was sent from Bletchley Park by lorry (and trailer) 
arriving the following day at Manchester University where it was met by Newman and Jackson.  
Indisputably, at least some Colossus components were eventually incorporated into the SSEM 48 
and perhaps also in other Manchester computers.  However the real historical significance of this 
episode transcends any mundane internalist concerns over the precise extent to which Colossi 
components came to be reused in later developments. Much more important is the mere fact of 
Jackson’s visit to Bletchley Park.  Jackson’s presence there and his access to Colossi in situ 
would have needed clearance in advance at the very highest level and conclusively establishes 
that there was official sanction for Newman to transplant knowledge gained from the Colossus 
development into the civilian world.  This runs counter to much received wisdom and critically 
undermines a key aspect of the two-project myth.  I shall return in greater detail to the myth of 
secrecy below. 
 
During the first year of the project’s life Newman spent around 63% of his estimated budget.  
                                                 
46 I am indebted to Prof. Simon Lavington for bringing this to my attention. 
47 I am indebted to Prof. Brian Randell for drawing this to my attention The original source material is to be found in 
the National Archives ref HW64/59.  
48 Racks, previously used on Colossus machines, are clearly identifiable  in some of the early photographs of the 
SSEM. 
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The difference between anticipated and actual spending was entirely the result of Kilburn’s 
salary being covered by TRE whose additional generosity in donating components had no further 
beneficial effect on Newman’s first year projections since he hadn’t allowed for them in any 
case.  There is no reason to believe that Newman would not have covered Kilburn’s wages had 
the TRE proved reluctant, since he had allowed for the cost of an engineer and had obtained the 
necessary funds.  It is extremely unlikely that the Royal Society, or any other grant awarding 
body, would have looked kindly on any attempt by Newman to pay Kilburn’s salary when 
alternative funding had unexpectedly appeared.  In fact, it should be said that the Royal Society 
showed great latitude in allowing the £20,000 originally intended for capital development to be 
spent post hoc on a building.  It is also worth mentioning that had the Royal Society instead 
clawed back the capital grant, matching funds would have had to be found from the budget 
supporting further computer development at Manchester.  The Royal Society can reasonably be 
thought of as major investors in the development of the machines that followed the SSEM.  
However, despite the financial scale and political importance of the contribution made by the 
Royal Society to the SSEM and to its successors, the part it played has received little 
acknowledgement from historians.     
 
What is the origin of the financial myth and what, if anything, does it reveal about the source of 
the two-project myth?   I have tried to present the Royal Society computing project  as Newman 
might have seen it.  However, viewed from the perspective of the department of Electro-
Technics it is possible to see things very differently.  No funds made their way from the Royal 
Society directly to the department of Electro-Technics and it might, in consequence,  be possible 
to come to the conclusion that the Royal Society were not supporting financially the 
development of the SSEM.  While this would help motivate one half of the financial myth it 
would give grounds for the other as it is equally true that no funds were received from the TRE 
into Electro-Technics unless some notional allowance is made for components supplied by TRE 
and used to support project work being undertaken by a Ph.D. student in the department.   
 
If the finances of the project are viewed from the personal perspective of Kilburn, the resulting 
picture looks remarkably like the financial myth.  As a Ph.D. student, Kilburn would presumably 
have had little detailed appreciation of financial arrangements not directly touching on him.  
Kilburn would, presumably,  not have been aware at the time that the salary costs and travel 
expenses of staff from another department were being paid for out of Royal Society funds.  
Indeed, even if the arrangements had been known to him, it is easy to imagine how this might not 
have appeared as constituting a meaningful contribution to the work on which he was personally 
engaged.  Furthermore, no-one in Electro-Technics is likely to have taken a markedly different 
view.  
 
In fairness, the arrangements put in place by the university for effecting payment from the Royal 
Society grant to the SSEM project were hardly straightforward.  For example, the salaries of 
Good and Rees were not paid directly from Royal Society funds but were ‘back-filled’.  Thus, 
the costs were borne, in the first instance,  by the mathematics department which was 
subsequently granted leave to employ a replacement full-time member of staff, the salary being 
met out of the Royal Society grant.49 
 
While the financial contribution of TRE was, from the point of view of university, merely 
nominal departmental or project funding it was, by contrast, very important from Kilburn’s 
                                                 
49 I am grateful to Mary Croarken for bringing this point to my attention. 
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perspective.  TRE were directly paying Kilburn’s salary and providing components on which his 
work was dependent.  In these circumstances, it was entirely reasonable that Kilburn should 
think of the support of the TRE as being more important than any other assistance.  In October 
1948, Kilburn’s salary started being paid out of Royal Society funds, but by then the SSEM was 
already up and running and the future of the development was not in doubt.  So, by the time 
Kilburn might have perceived himself as a direct beneficiary of Royal Society support,  it could 
all too easily have appeared, as Napper puts it:  
 
“That ‘Professor Newman had a grant’ was true, but in effect it was not 
used until it was not required.” (Napper, 1998) 
 
This bald statement of the financial myth describes a perspective which is unique to Kilburn and 
it is his viewpoint alone rather than the departmental or project perspective which is privileged in 
the financial myth.   
 
Contextualizating the Two-project Myth 
 
One of the principal defects in the account  suggested by the two-project myth is that it ignores 
the wider context in which Newman, Williams and Kilburn were working.  As has been noted 
already, Williams’ predecessor Jackson, had already expressed an interest in the Royal Society 
Computing Project and had offered “to have the electrical staff on the strength of his laboratory” 
(M. H. A. Newman, 1946b).  Certainly Williams had his own agenda and interests but when he 
arrived at Manchester he was not operating in a vacuum.  The Royal Society award had marked 
out Manchester as an important centre for the development of new technology.  Such a large 
grant from so prestigious a source would, presumably, have carried great political significance 
within the University and it would outside.  Consequently, there would have been considerable 
pressure on Williams to continue Jackson’s policy of supporting Newman’s Royal Society 
project even if he had personally been disinclined to do so.  Indeed, Williams’ attitude to the 
project is just the sort of issue which his appointments panel, may well have explored during 
interview.  Had the panel generally or Newman and Blackett in particular got any sense that 
Williams intended to set up a rival computing project in the department of Electro-Technics it is 
extremely unlikely they would have supported his appointment.   
 
In fact, Williams had no interest in developing computers as such.  He was focused on the 
narrower engineering challenge presented by the CRT store and, as we have seen, was perfectly 
happy to acknowledge an almost complete ignorance of comput ing per se.  It would have been 
much to Williams’ advantage to be seen to be contributing to a large externally-supported inter-
departmental project particularly as such an involvement would have given his own work a 
greatly enhanced significance and would have served greatly to improve his political stock at the 
University.  Working relatively independently on the engineering side of Newman’s project gave 
Williams the advantage of an alliance with Blackett and Newman, opened up a useful source of 
ideas and intellectual assistance courtesy of the mathematicians and provided a guarantee of 
financial support for his work, should he have needed it.   
 
By contrast, setting up a rival project would have represented a high-risk strategy  - even 
assuming that the University would have been prepared to let him embark on it.   By dividing the 
intellectual resources available at Manchester he would have lessened the chances of either 
project succeeding and almost certainly alienated Blackett, Newman and the Royal Society.  
Williams would have realized that even had a rival project been entirely successful there would 
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have been nothing gained which could not have been achieved at far less political risk by 
working within the Royal Society context.  Failure would, of course,  have left him very 
exposed. 
 
The two-project myth implies that Williams was prepared, immediately on appointment, to 
jeopardize  his position by instigating an independent computing project.  No plausible 
explanation is offered for his alleged behaviour.  It is only by decontextualizing Williams’ 
supposed actions that they can be made to appear reasonable.  However, once Williams is placed 
back in the correct historical context, the notion of his setting up a second computing project in 
Manchester looks a much less credible, as in consequence, does the two-project myth itself.   
 
Post-war Knowledge Transfer 
 
In 1975, Donald Michie, a member of Newman’s section at Bletchley Park,  made the tantalizing 
suggestion that: 
  
“An enormous amount was transferred in an extremely seminal way  to 
the post war developments of computers in Britain.  It wasn’t 
appreciated that the transference was taking place and people, say at 
Manchester, who listened to Newman’s early post war lectures on the 
possibilities of computing and on computer design were quite unaware 
that this was based on an earlier period of systematic war work but as to 
the transmission, this transmission was very real and on quite a large 
scale ....   
 
Newman set about quite deliberately and consciously for a period of 
years to see that what had been learnt was enabled to be transplanted 
and should flourish in the environment in Manchester over which he had 
very considerable influence as a very much respected senior Professor 
of Mathematics… “ (Evans, 1976c) 
 
It is certainly clear that the fundamental abstract ideas of which the Manchester Baby was the 
earliest physical embodiment were developed by Alan Turing around 1935-6.  Fully aware of 
Turing’s ideas, and perhaps partly instrumental in inspiring them,  Newman led the development 
of the world’s first working electronic digital computer in condit ions of great secrecy at 
Bletchley Park.  It is also apparent that Colossus changed forever the lives and careers of many 
of the people who encountered it and a number of them became involved, directly after the end 
of hostilities, in projects intended to produce stored program digital computers.  Association with 
Colossus appears to have engendered, in a key group of people a new research agenda, which 
Mike Mahoney correctly characterises as an agreement about what ought to be done: 
 
“a consensus concerning the problems of the field, their order of 
importance or priority, the means of solving them, and perhaps most 
importantly, what constitutes a solution” (Mahoney, 2002) 
 
One of the priority-enabling tasks in which they were engaged was spreading the main ideas of 
digital computing.  These were, in essence, a more accessible explanation of the theoretical 
insights developed by Turing combined with the practical insights gained developing and using 
Colossus.  There is indisputable evidence of an active process of knowledge transfer of abstract 
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ideas tempered by practical experience derived at Bletchley Park into civilian computing 
projects.   
 
The Myth of Secrecy50 
 
In the course of this paper I have looked in some detail at what I have called the two-project 
myth and the financial myth.  A third myth, both more widespread and better founded than either 
of the others is the myth of secrecy, according to which Colossus, although chronologically the 
first working electronic digital computer was completely without influence in the development of 
the stored program computer because it was kept a closely guarded secret.  
 
It is certainly true that the work of the Bletchley code breakers was highly classified.  No-one 
working at Bletchley was allowed, without permission, to discuss their work with anyone  
working in another hut, much less outside.  It is also true that great priority was attached to 
ensuring that no detailed word of the techniques employed to crack enemy codes should leak out. 
Indeed, the Germans were not even supposed to know that their traffic had been intercepted, let 
alone deciphered and read.  
 
However, there was no general restriction placed on divulging generic scientific knowledge 
acquired at Bletchley.  An example of this is Good’s treatise on probability (Good, 1950) which 
was based in its entirety on work carried out jointly with Turing at Bletchley and used routinely 
both in Enigma and Fish work.  Nothing about Bletchley appears in the published version and 
the unique Bletchley nomenclature e.g., “decibans”51 is replaced by other terminology.   
 
Newman must have interpreted the existence of a computer at Bletchley as ‘generic scientific 
knowledge’ because he was prepared to speak of it although he quite circumspect in how he 
expressed himself.  Writing to von Neumann in 1946, Newman revealed not only that his interest 
in computers went back to 1943-44 and was independent of any American efforts but that he had 
some personal experience of computing gained in the context of his war work the details of 
which were classified.  Interestingly, he indicates a preparedness to speak more freely in person 
than he may write in a letter: 
 
“My more particular reason for writing at the moment is computing 
machines.  I have just heard through Hartree, that you are starting up a 
machine project in Princeton.  I am also hoping to embark on a 
computing machine section here, having got very interested in electronic 
devices of this kind during the last two or three years.  By about eighteen 
months ago I had decided to try my hand at starting up a machine unit 
when I got out.  It was indeed one of my reasons for coming to 
Manchester that the set-up here is favourable in several ways.  This was 
before I knew anything of the American work, or of the scheme for a unit 
at the National Physical Laboratory. Later I heard of the various 
American machines, existing and projected, from Hartree and Flowers. 
 
… I don’t expect to get started, even on paper, in less than a few months, 
and then the first thing will be for whole unit to try and learn something 
in detail about what has already been done.  I am of course a complete 
                                                 
50 I am very greatly in the debt of Donald Michie for patiently explaining  the precise nature and extent of the 
secrecy restrictions placed on BP personnel.  This section owes much to Donald’s tutelage. 
51 The units by which log odds were measured. 
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beginner, though I have had certain relevant experience.  What I should 
most like is to come out and talk to you (for one thing I am still a bit 
cramped in discussing the past, and I have to ask you not to put 2 and 2 
together too accurately, and not to pass it on if you do.)  I don’t see 
much prospect of raising the wind for that yet, but something might turn 
up later.” (M. H. A. Newman, 1946a) 
 
Given the general constraints placed on talking about work undertaken at Bletchley, it must be 
assumed that Newman was absolutely confident that it was permissible for him to talk, in 
suitably decontextualised ways, about his experience of electronic digital computing.  It has 
already been noted that, in 1945, Newman accompanied Jackson to see the Colossi in situ and 
from this I have inferred that Newman must have been acting with official sanction.  Newman 
also discussed some aspects of the Colossus with Williams who, understanding from Newman 
exactly where they had come from, used (at the very least) some recycled Colossus racks in the 
SSEM (Randell, 1975). 
 
Background evidence of the enthusiasm of the authorities to see the most advanced techniques 
utilised in peacetime developments can be found in a DSIR Interdepartmental Technical 
Committee Report produced in 1944 which found there to be a strong case for a Central 
Mathematical Station which would: 
 
“(1)   Undertake research into new computing methods and  
 machines. 
 
 (2)   Encourage the development of new computing methods and 
 instruments and the dissemination of knowledge of them and of 
 existing methods.”  (Report of Interdepartmental Technical 
Committee on a Proposed Central Mathematical Station., 1944) 
 
The committee had representatives from the NPL, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Supply, the 
Ministry of Home Security, the Ordnance Survey Department and the War Office as well as the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) itself.   That such a group were keen to 
see the latest developments disseminated suggests strongly that a climate existed in which a 
controlled knowledge transfer from Bletchley to post war computing projects would have been 
supported.   
 
By the time that Newman applied to the Royal Society for a grant to support his proposal to build 
a computer at Manchester it was possible to him to reveal in writing that: 
 
“We have on the staff mathematicians (besides myself) who have 
acquired an interest and relevant experience in these problems during 
the war. 
 
…Some fast electrical counters and other equipment have been loaned 
to me by a Government Department, in case they should be of use for 
this project, and are now in Manchester. 
 
…The Post Office Research Station at Dollis Hill, with which I was 
fortunate in making contact during the war, are also interested in the 
project.” (M. H. A. Newman, 1946b) 
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It may have been possible to infer, on the basis of Newman’s comments, that the Post Office 
research station at Dollis Hill, Newman himself and others now in the Mathematics department 
at Manchester had wartime experience touching on digital computing.  Much more importantly, 
Newman was also sending a clear signal that there was government support for the transfer of the 
experience gained during the war to utilised in the proposed development at Manchester. 
 
A sub-committee of the Royal Society was formed to advise on the merits of Newman’s 
proposals.  It comprised Patrick Blackett, Douglas Hartree, Sir Charles Darwin, William Hodge, 
and Henry (J.H.C.) Whitehead (Royal Society, 1946a).   Apparently, as part of the process, 
Hartree may have been taken to see a Colossus in situ at Bletchley Park (Kahn, 1976)52.   
 
In giving their support to Newman, the Royal Society made the following observation: 
 
“The committee considers that NEWMAN himself, because of his 
mathematical background and wartime experience, is particularly well 
qualified for directing this project.”((Royal Society, 1946c p.69) 
 
In summary, it may said that Newman was prepared to discuss, in a carefully decontextualised 
way, the existence, and probably some aspects of the design, of a digital computer developed 
during the war at Bletchley Park.  He was prepared to indicate that he and others in his 
department at Manchester had personal experience of this machine.  He was prepared to indicate 
that some aspects of the development were subject to secrecy restrictions which could have been 
inferred to include the use to which the machine was put.  The authorities sanctioned Newman’s 
limited disclosure and actively facilitated the transfer of computing knowledge gained at 
Bletchley into (at least) the Manchester SSEM development.  The extent to which other early 
British computing projects were also assisted and the means by which this may have been 
accomplished is a fascinating subject but one which falls outside the scope of the current 
discussion.  While it is true that there was a great deal of very effective security surrounding the 
work which took place in Bletchley Park it would be a mistake to think that this served to 
prevent Colossus being influential in the development of computers in peace time Britain.  
Indeed, there is reason to believe Michie’s claim that Newman was engaged in knowledge 
transfer is only one aspect of a larger story of knowledge transfer implicitly, and perhaps 
explicitly, supported by the government.    
 
The Direct Influence of Turing’s Work and the Assessment of his Peers 
 
There are two main routes by which Turing may have influenced directly the early development 
of computing:  either by his writing or through his personal involvement with people and 
projects.  Turing’s ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’ 
is almost universally thought of today as being the single most important  paper in the history of 
computing.  As D.W. Davies put it in 1975:  
 
“Well, I think his discovery … was really greater than that of Babbage 
or of Princeton University or von Neumann or anybody.  Because the…I 
mean, von Neumann’s contribution at this stage was a particular kind of 
                                                 
52 Good’s unsupported account of a visit by Hartree, which might otherwise seem questionable, is given support by 
the well-documented visit of Jackson to see and, presumably examine in some detail, the Colossi in 1945.   
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machine architecture which has served us very well but it was only one 
of many which would have worked equally… equally well.  Turing 
produced a key idea on which every stored program machine was based.  
I think probably computer scientists generally haven’t understood or 
appreciated the depth of Turing’s contribution, partly because it’s in 
unfamiliar language and it doesn’t correspond exactly to any of the 
concepts that have grown up since” (Evans, 1976d) 
 
Jack Good echoes this theme: 
 
“…his original work about 1936 is regarded as quite fundamental.  The 
notion of a Turing  machine was an especially useful idea in 
mathematical logic and the foundations of mathematics because it made 
the concept seem so much more concrete to have them expressed in 
terms of exact mechanical processes instead of just formal logic which is 
rather tricky. ” (Evans, 1976h) 
 
Good’s is a judgment uttered in retrospect, for while he knew of Turing by reputation at 
Cambridge he had not read his work. (Evans, 1976h) 
 
Turing’s paper was published in the Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society and was 
targeted at, and would have been read by, mathematicians.  Newman would, of course, have been 
intimately familiar with Turing’s work and possibly his thinking was shaped thereby in ways 
which turned out to be very productive in the Bletchley Park context.  However it would be a 
mistake to think that Newman, when drawing up the specification for Colossus, was consciously 
attempting a direct implementation of Turing’s thinking.  The debt owed to Turing’s ideas seems 
clear when looking from the perspective of the early 21st century, but according to Newman, at 
the time:  
 
“I think we were not conscious of any dependence on  those – I think it’s 
a bit far fetched you know, because the main idea of… Turing … that 
you must put in something which tells the machine to do one thing if the 
answer is 0 and another if the answer is 1… we didn’t have that you 
see.” (Evans, 1975) 
 
It has already been remarked that von Neumann probably became aware of the 
Entscheidungsproblem paper no later than the summer of 1938 and, like Good, considered 
Turing to have been responsible for the fundamental conception of computing.  However, while 
we may feel confident that von Neumann was influenced by Turing’s work it is more difficult to 
be quite certain about the precise extent and nature of the influence.   
 
Discerning a direct line of influence from Turing’s writing to the engineers is even harder to 
establish.  Responding to Chris Evans’ question about the effect which Turing’s 
Entscheidungsproblem paper had on the scientific world at the time of its publication, Newman 
was fairly sceptical: 
 
“I should say practically none at all. I don't think the engineers at that 
time were reading the kind of periodical that it came out in and Turing 
himself, right from the start, said it would be interesting to try and make 
such a machine but he realised, of course, that it would operate, if it was 
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made like his design, so slowly, that it would have no relation to any 
practical problem.” (Evans, 1975) 
 
Tommy Flowers acknowledged Turing’s influence but in that case it was more as a result of 
personal contact than through familiarity with Turing’s published work: 
 
“I was introduced to the… to the working people, the first of whom was 
Alan Turing and Alan Turing had the reputation of being practically 
incoherent in explanation. The astonishing or interesting thing was that 
we never had any difficulty.  I think perhaps we could talk the same 
language, I am not a very good mathematician but some of the other 
people were better and Turing was anything but an engineer but somehow 
or other we could talk to one another and he could tell us what he wanted 
and we could tell him what we could do. … the rapport was really quite 
remarkable. We never seemed to get at cross purposes and we always 
seemed to understand one another. I don't know why but… that did 
happen” (Evans, 1976j) 
 
Another of the Bletchley Park engineers,  A.W.M. Coombs recalled later that: 
 
“Turing was the guiding light. Turing was a brilliant mathematician but 
he was a rotten engineer you know. His ideas for making the machine, 
the engineering ideas,  God help us! that machine would never have 
worked if they’d tried to use those but he was brilliant as a philosopher 
and a mathematician and… as a seer of the future but not as an 
engineer” (Evans, 1976a) 
 
The characterization of Turing as an engineer of questionable ability is also offered by A.D. 
Booth: 
 
 “I mean to put it crudely, he was a brilliant man but he had got very 
eccentric ideas about engineering as I happen to know and I mean this is 
fact,  He wanted to run mercury delay lines using a thing called a supra-
generative amplifier as the recycling amplifier.  Now anybody who has 
anything to do with supra-generative amplifiers will realise that it is the 
last thing you could ever use as it simply wouldn't work and this was one 
of the causes of trouble.” (Evans, 1976b) 
 
However, despite not being a trained engineer, Turing had, earlier than anyone else in Britain,  
some very clear ideas on how to build an electronic digital stored program computer.  As Mike 
Woodger remembered:  
 
“… it’s quite astonishing now looking back on it to see how highly 
developed his notion was of what he had to do at NPL.  In fact, before he 
even knew he was coming to NPL he had been drafting  the design of an 
electronic computer  since he knew of electronics at Bletchley Park 
during the war and his code breaking activities and he already had 
pretty clear ideas in his mind as to how to go about it, how big it would 
be not yet what the storage media... medium would be.  That was the big 
 Page 37 
gap but he had drafted several preliminary designs for such a machine 
which he numbered later on versions 1 to 5.” (Lavington, 1976) 
 
Despite generally having a poor reputation in the area, Turing’s engineering insight was often 
very great.  F.C. Williams famously used the ‘regeneration’ princip le’ as the theoretical basis on 
which the CRT store was founded.  The process involves storing binary digit in the form of an 
electrical charge on the phosphor screen of a cathode ray tube.  Due to the tendency of the charge 
to leak away it was necessary to arrange matters so that the charge was read and quickly re-
written (regenerated) in order to preserve the information over usefully long periods of time.  
This process represented a brilliant insight but, as Hodges noted in 1992: 
 
“No-one at the time or since seems to have noticed that [Turing] 
thought of it earlier, just one example of the refusal of people to believe 
he could do anything practical.” (Hodges, 1992 p.558)   
 
History favours winners and had NPL taken advantage of the lead which Turing had given them 
and pressed ahead rapidly with the construction of the ACE it is entirely probable that Turing 
would today enjoy a considerably greater reputation as an engineer than is actually the case.  
Turing’s computer design ideas, quite a few of which were workarounds necessitated by the 
limitations of acoustic line delay memory, were certainly very interesting and his design 
produced the very best performance possible within the severe limits imposed by the technology.   
 
Wilkinson goes some way to explaining why Turing, often so much in advance of his 
contemporaries, was not appreciated as much as he should have been: 
 
“Turing was perhaps the most distinguished  person that we have had at 
the Lab during my time, a brilliant brain but not a very easy man to 
collaborate with and also his plans for the ACE were very ambitious.  
He wanted to build a very large computer and I don't think he would 
have ever agreed, or wholeheartedly supported the construction of such 
a small machine….. Turing was head and shoulder above us all, I mean 
he was a great genius perhaps a genius of his type was not what you 
wanted at that stage in the game.” (Evans, 1976i) 
 
Huskey’s assessment of Turing is both generous and reflective:  
 
“Turing, he is in a different class and I think that if I could place myself 
back in that position, you see, I think we didn't appreciate him as much 
as we should have. We certainly recognised his ability and respected the 
things he could do and he was a very high powered mathematician so 
for example, if a question came up about how a delay line work or 
something, he would write down the equations and work it out 
mathematically and say this is what it would do you see. Well, we 
weren't that sure about whether his equations really represented that 
delay line properly or not so I think we weren't really comfortable with 
his answers to some of these questions but there was no question about 
his ability and if we just had faith about the connection between his 
theoretical capability and the real physics of the delay line, or whatever 
it was, then we would have been probably even more respectful than we 
were.” (Evans, 1976f) 
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The balance of the evidence available suggests that Turing’s 1936 paper, considered so important 
today, had almost no readership among contemporary engineers and, in consequence, had little 
or no direct effect on their thinking when it came to the development of digital electronic stored 
program computers.53  There is little reason to believe that even the Colossus owed anything 
directly to “On computable numbers”.  None of the Post Office engineers who, at the suggestion 
of Newman, came into contact with Turing’s Entscheidungsproblem paper could make much of 
it and neither they nor the mathematicians who had read Turing had his ideas knowingly at the 
front of their minds nor were they trying to implement a Turing machine.  In the United States, 
Turing was read by von Neumann but there is little hard evidence concerning the nature and 
extent of any effect produced in his thinking thereby. 
 
By the time Turing was appointed as a Reader at Manchester54 there was little scope for him to 
influence the design of the Manchester machine in any direct way, but in light of the discussion 
above,  Kilburn surely went too far when he suggested in 1975 that “the mathematics group, I 
think they would agree,  contributed very little [to the design]” (Evans, 1976k) 
 
Turing did have some direct impact on the course of British post-war computing.  His ACE 
report of 1945 was read or its contents were communicated directly to a wide cross-section of the 
engineers working on the development of computers in the immediate post-war period.  The 
series of lectures which he delivered with Wilkinson at the London headquarters of the Ministry 
of Supply were initiated because it was considered more efficient that he deliver a course to a 
large group rather than continue the process of explaining his ideas to individuals (Womersley 
J.R. 1946). The MOSAIC, built by Coombs and Chandler came about directly as a result of these 
lectures although Wilkes and Kilburn, who also attended the lectures, appear not to have found 
them valuable.  We have already seen how Kilburn later recalled that before attending the course 
he already knew how to build a computer.  However, it has not been possible to independent ly 
verify this suggestion.  Wilkes, who had already attended the Moore School lectures and come 
back with clear ideas on how to go about building a computer, had a more particular and very 
well founded concern: 
 
“[Turing] outlined his ideas for the logical design of the Automatic 
Computing Engine (ACE), as the NPL computer was to be called.  These 
ideas were quite different from anyone else’s.  If sometime in 1950, a 
new and superior type of memory had suddenly appeared either in 
Manchester of Cambridge, then it would have been possible – with 
somewhat of a struggle, since all digital engineering involved a struggle 
in those days – to connect it in place of the CRT or mercury memory.  In 
either case the interface between the memory and the rest of the machine 
was such that the programmers would have known no difference.  Not so 
with the ACE, which was predicated wholly on the mercury memory 
around which everything was built. The programmer juggled with a set 
of tank numbers and timing numbers in order to get pulse trains 
representing the various numbers to come together at the right place 
and be in step.  It was entirely in accordance with Turing’s turn of mind 
that the programming for such a computer should have involved a 
knowledge of the way that the hardware was organized. 
                                                 
53 Obviously the ACE and its derivatives must be excepted from this comment. 
54 October 1948. 
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I did not believe that computers would develop along the lines that 
Turing was advocating, and for this reason I stopped going to his 
lectures” (Wilkes, 1985 p.136) 
 
To the extent that Turing was influential he was so mostly by indirect means.  His ideas, which 
were directly unknown to almost all of those who might have profited by them and considered 
incomprehensible to most of the rest, needed to be mediated by others in order to be useful.  In 
this capacity the role of Max Newman crucial.  From the outset, Newman was involved in 
helping shape Turing’s ideas and was instrumental in many aspects of Turing’s professional life  
Fully aware of Turing’s ideas as expressed in “On computable Numbers” Newman went on the 
lead the development of the Colossus at Bletchley Park.  Deeply affected by the possibilities 
opened up by the world’s first working electronic digital computer, Newman and a small group 
of like-minded mathematicians, physicists and engineers conceived the idea of building stored-
program computers – universal Turing machines – in the peace time context.  It was Newman 
who, with Blackett’s help, secured the backing of the Royal Society to build at Manchester what 
would turn out to be the first electronic digital stored-program computer.  It was Newman and 
Blackett who brought Williams and, through him, Kilburn into the project.  It was Newman who 
took on the bulk of the computing education of the Manchester engineers that put them into the 
position to tackle the construction of the SSEM and two young mathematicians from his 
department Jack Good and David Rees made contributions to the logical design of the machine 
and must be considered instrumental in its final success.  Newman conceived of building a stored 
program computer while he was still at Bletchley Park and this led, by the route I have indicated, 
to the development of the Manchester Baby.   
 
While the conception of the Baby may thus be traced back to Bletchley Park it was by no means 
a one-man effort.  The Manchester machine was a by-product of the theoretical genius of Alan 
Turing and the embodiment of principles enunciated by him in 1936.  However it would not have 
come about without the drive and skill of Max Newman.  The role of Patrick Blackett has been 
alluded to on a number of occasions during this paper and his contribution to the development of 
computing in Britain after the war warrants  careful study.  On the implementation side, the 
contribution made by Freddie Williams in developing the CRT memory was absolutely crucial 
and the accomplishments of Tom Kilburn were, if anything, even more important.  The 
development of the SSEM was a team effort involving many people by no means all of whom 
have been mentioned in this paper.  The words of Herman Goldstine, made in the context of the 
ENIAC project, would have equal applicability here: 
 
“I think that if one were trying to be impartial about it he would just 
have to distribute credit to the whole group.  I’ve mentioned or alluded 
to the fact that there was a lot of controversy about who did what but… 
there’s really about an infinite amount of credit to be distributed and 
therefore everybody who contributed, I think, did a remarkable job.” 
(Evans, 1976g) 
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Appendix 1 Early Block Diagrams 
   
Fig 1 “Possible Block Diagram” by I.J. Good (3rd June 1947) given to Kilburn (10th June 1947) 
 
AC Act Counter. (Contains the address of the current or next instruction) 
T  Tree (for the memory). Operated by 12 inputs and having 4096 outputs 
CR  Control Register.  Contains one-word instruction 
I/P  Input 
M  Memory 
IT  Instruction Tree. For interpreting the code numbers of different types of instructions 
W Works. The circuits which perform the possible types of instruction. 
A Accumulator 
R  (Arithmetic) Register 
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Fig 3 “The Baby as built” Courtesy of Hans Pufal
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